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PROHIBITIONS ON PRICE FIXING
Louis Kaplow*
ABSTRACT
This article compares two policies toward coordinated oligopolistic price elevation.
Most commentators endorse the view that the law should (and does) prohibit only
those price elevations produced by certain sorts of interﬁrm communications, such as
secret price negotiations. In contrast, little attention has been devoted to a more direct
approach that encompasses all coordinated price elevations that can be detected and
sanctioned effectively. It is demonstrated that the conventional formulation rests on
numerous misconceptions, involves complex and costly detection if its logical implica-
tions are taken seriously, and tends to target caseswith relatively lowdeterrencebeneﬁts
and high chilling costs in contrast to those targeted under the direct approach.
1. INTRODUCTION
The rule against price fixing is the least controversial prohibition in competi-
tion law throughout the world. There is, however, far less consensus than meets
the eye on what constitutes price fixing and on how legal regimes should iden-
tify and remedy it. Moreover, prevailing views and existing doctrine are not
grounded in systematic economic analysis of the problem. Instead, acting in a
surprisingly formalistic manner, commentators—and, to a degree, government
agencies and courts—have tended to focus on penalizing certain sorts of
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interfirm communications that facilitate coordinated oligopolistic price eleva-
tion rather than on whether such price increases have occurred.1 This article
systematically compares this conventionally favored version of the prohibition
to a more direct approach aimed at socially harmful coordinated price elevation
that can be detected and sanctioned effectively.2
A priori, one would expect a direct approach to a problem to be superior to
an indirect, circumscribed one. Analysts, enforcers, and adjudicators usually do
best by asking the right question—the one of direct social concern—rather than
by attempting to answer a substantially different one. Sometimes indirect
approaches turn out to be superior, but this can be ascertained only after sus-
tained analysis that articulates the competing methods and explicitly assesses
their differences. It is therefore striking that many of the topics investigated here
have received limited prior attention.
There is another respect in which the current state of discourse is puzzling.
The proffered method involves the direct application of economic understand-
ings to the problem at hand. In recent decades, courts and commentators have
increasingly embraced the view that competition law should be grounded in
economic substance rather than formalistic distinctions. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions in Sylvania, Matsushita, and Leegin come to mind,3 and the
European Union has been moving in a similar direction even if less strongly.
Moreover, Richard Posner’s (1969) article and subsequent book (2001, first
edition 1976) famously endorsed a more economically based strategy for deal-
ing with oligopoly pricing.4 Nevertheless, subsequent commentary, even when
1 This sort of position is prominently advanced by Turner (1962) and Areeda and Hovenkamp (2003).
For an assessment of attempts to make sense of the law’s concept of horizontal agreement from a
number of perspectives, see Kaplow (2011c).
2 Attention is confined to coordination on price. Nonprice coordination has many similarities but
also important differences (for example, nonprice coordination is often more difficult to accomplish
and detection of some types of coordinated behavior using market-based evidence may well be more
challenging).
3 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 596 (1986); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887–889 (2007).
4 If the economic evidence presented in a case warrants an inference of collusive pricing,
there is neither legal nor practical justification for requiring evidence that will support
the further inference that the collusion was explicit rather than tacit. From an economic
standpoint it is a detail whether the collusive pricing scheme was organized and
implemented in such a way as to generate evidence of actual communications. Posner
(2001, 94).
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citing his writings, does not significantly engage their content.5 As will be seen,
the present analysis goes well beyond Posner’s and differs in many respects,
which can hardly be surprising in light of the decades of theoretical and em-
pirical work in industrial organization in the interim; yet the spirit of his ar-
gument as well as some of his key ideas provide important illumination.
Part 2 presents the direct approach, beginning in section 2.1 with an exam-
ination of the social problem. From the outset, it is notable that none of the
pertinent theory directly distinguishes between successful oligopolistic price
elevation due merely to recognized interdependence (firms refrain from price
cutting because of an expectation of retaliation derived from a shared appreci-
ation of their circumstances) and that resulting from classic cartel behavior
(firms meet secretly in hotel rooms to discuss prices and the consequences of
cheating), or various cases in between. The harm from price coordination de-
pends most directly on the extent and duration of supracompetitive pricing, not
on the means of reaching or maintaining an understanding to charge the
heightened price.
An economic approach to addressing coordinated oligopolistic price eleva-
tion through legal liability—like the economic approach to law enforcement
more generally (see, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell 2007)—seeks to determine liability
and apply sanctions based primarily on the deterrence benefits that result as
well as any chilling of desirable behavior that may ensue, while also considering
the costs of operating the regime. Section 2.2 explores the problem of detection,
the greatest challenge in the regulation of interdependent oligopoly pricing.
Firms naturally seek to hide illegal aspects of their behavior, and reliable indi-
cators are not always readily obtainable at low cost to enforcers. One set of
detection techniques involves the use of market-based evidence to infer suc-
cessful oligopolistic coordination, such as looking for sharp price drops asso-
ciated with price wars. Others rely on internal evidence, which may pertain to
firms’ own estimates of costs and demand conditions as well as their under-
standing of their strategic situation vis-a`-vis their competitors. Interfirm com-
munications, when evidence thereof is available, also provide useful, perhaps
decisive, information on whether successful coordination has occurred.
The degree to which conditions are conducive to coordinated oligopoly
pricing is also quite relevant. Highly conducive conditions make inferences of
successful interdependent pricing more credible—but hardly certain, among
other reasons due to the possibility of effective deterrence—whereas uncondu-
cive conditions cast doubt on its plausibility. As will be explored in part 3, this
5 Exceptions are F.M. Scherer’s (1977, 981–984) review of the first edition of Posner’s book, which
devotes a handful of pages to the subject at hand, and Richard Markovits, on which see note 9.
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feature of sound detection strategy differs importantly from what many asso-
ciate with a focus on the existence of particular interfirm communications
because, under certain assumptions, more conducive conditions reduce the
likelihood that such communications occurred even though they increase the
magnitude of the net expected social harm from a failure to apply sanctions.
The analysis of sanctions in section 2.3 concentrates primarily on deterrence.
A major challenge in setting monetary sanctions is determining the extent of
price elevation, although this magnitude will often be indicated by much of the
evidence on detection considered in section 2.2. In principle, the measurement
problem is the same whether price elevation was accomplished through secret
meetings, mere recognition of interdependence, or in any other manner. The
threat of imprisonment as well as fines assessed against individual actors can be
a useful supplement, particularly in light of agency problems within firms.
Injunctions are also considered. Although much academic commentary fixates
on injunctions, it is not evident that they are important in controlling coordi-
nated oligopoly pricing.
Part 2 would seem to cover all pertinent aspects of the regulation of price
fixing by considering the nature of the problem, how to detect its presence, and
what remedies to apply. In the course of this investigation, the commonly
advocated approach—which most commentators also contend describes cur-
rent law in leading jurisdictions—of attacking only express and perhaps also
tacit agreements, variously defined, barely surfaces. That is, it does not emerge
from a systematic consideration of how best to address coordinated oligopol-
istic price elevation. The core of this article, part 3, systematically compares the
communications-based prohibition and the direct approach presented in part 2
in order to ascertain whether anything important was overlooked and to iden-
tify explicitly the defects of the consensus method.
Initially, the conventional prohibition is defined, which turns out to be a
difficult task.6 Most views can be captured by supposing that the price-fixing
prohibition is limited to certain sorts of interfirm communication, whether
designated by mode, content, or otherwise. This method on its face seems
problematic because it focuses not on whether the means employed in fact
caused harm in a given case but rather on whether one versus another means
was employed. Moreover, such a distinction suggests that detection will often
prove difficult, as indeed is the case.
The essential contrast with the direct approach is that the communications-
based prohibition uses a large portion of the most relevant evidence indicative
of undesirable behavior in an indirect fashion and also counts evidence
6 See Kaplow (2011c) for an exhaustive analysis.
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concerning conduciveness of conditions backwards, in what is referred to here
as a paradox of proof. Specifically, under certain assumptions that many en-
dorse, evidence of an unusually high danger of successful coordinated oligopoly
pricing exonerates firms instead of raising the likelihood that they will be sub-
ject to sanctions.7 As a consequence, the communications-based prohibition
tends to assign liability in cases involving both less social harm and greater
chilling costs compared to those targeted by the direct approach. The direct
method, with an appropriately calibrated burden of proof, can be shown to
dominate the communications-based prohibition in that, for a common rate of
application, the direct approach targets cases with both relatively larger deter-
rence benefits and relatively smaller chilling costs.
These problems relating to detection and others arise because a communica-
tions-based prohibition requires that one not only determine the presence of
interdependent oligopoly pricing—the focus of the direct approach elaborated
in part 2—but also identify the means by which it was accomplished. This
supplemental requirement is particularly difficult to meet because firms at-
tempt to keep their methods secret, because the difference between permitted
and prohibited means is formally rather than functionally determined, and
because there is little empirical evidence that could guide the necessary
inference process. As a result, the conventional approach is significantly more
challenging to apply, which is ironic in light of its widely being favored on
administrability grounds.
Part 4 considers a number of additional subjects: an alternative approach
under which liability cannot be based on circumstantial evidence, contrary to
the longstanding norm in competition law; implications of the contrasting
approaches for other areas of competition law, such as the stringency of
limits on horizontal mergers and the regulation of practices that might facilitate
oligopolistic coordination; the manner in which rapid evolution in commu-
nications technology might influence the analysis, particularly concerning de-
tection; whether dispositive motions can be helpful in quickly and cheaply
disposing of weak cases; and how the various approaches square with legal
doctrine.
Finally, the leading three arguments offered in favor of the traditional view
are related explicitly to the foregoing analysis. One argument asserts a difficulty
in attacking purely interdependent behavior because such would involve com-
manding firms to behave irrationally. This criticism is mistaken because it omits
consideration of deterrence: applying heavy sanctions to certain choices will
7 Under other assumptions, which also find support, this paradox is reduced or eliminated, but in a
manner that undermines most of the basis for paying attention to the conventional method.
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change what firms find it rational to do. Another objection is that making price
elevation by oligopolists illegal is inconsistent with the legality of price elevation
by monopolists. This point ignores the purpose of separate, more stringent
prohibitions on group behavior and, moreover, implies that classic cartels
should be legal. Third, it is argued that remedies, particularly injunctive
relief, directed at price elevation are problematic because they amount to
price regulation. This claim is misconceived because, as mentioned, effective
control is best accomplished through penalties that achieve deterrence rather
than by relying on directive legal commands. However, this argument is sug-
gestive of an important concern with competition policy regarding price fixing
that is underdeveloped in the existing literature, namely, that the detection of
violations can be quite difficult, raising the problem of false positives, the pro-
spect of which chills desirable behavior. As emphasized throughout part 2, this
concern should indeed be central in devising price-fixing rules, but the analysis
here shows that it does not imply the desirability of the conventional approach
over a direct method that takes explicit account of possible chilling costs.
The conclusion to the article emphasizes two respects in which the present
analysis is incomplete. First, the focus throughout is not on the question that
has preoccupied much prior discussion, “How should we define the term
‘agreement’?,” but instead on the question, “What approach toward coordi-
nated oligopoly pricing best promotes social welfare?” In answering the latter, it
is natural to proceed by examining the nature of the problem and then deter-
mining how to identify its presence and to remedy it. Modern competition law
emphasizes economic substance over form, has an open-ended, flexible formu-
lation, and could in principle be amended. Also, under the laws of many jur-
isdictions, including the United States, a more substantive approach arguably
conforms better to the statutory language, much of the relevant precedent, and
aspects of existing practice than does the more formalistic approach that is
widely endorsed—points developed in detail in a companion article (Kaplow
2011c). Even if prevailing doctrine imposes significant constraints, it is best to
start by trying to determine what in principle is the most sensible way to address
coordinated oligopolistic price elevation.
Second, optimal policy depends greatly on empirical evidence in realms
where existing knowledge is incomplete. One set of issues concerns the extent
of oligopolistic price elevation that would prevail under various regimes.
Another involves the manner in which such coordinated pricing is
achieved—for example, with resort to what sorts of communication—and,
more broadly, how much of it can be detected, by which methods, and at
what error cost. Without further knowledge, it is difficult to identify an optimal
regime with confidence. However, the present framework not only guides that
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decision in the interim but also sharpens the research agenda so that better
strategies might be devised in the future.
2 . DIRECT APPROACH 8
A direct approach to the challenge of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation
consists of identification of the social problem, detection of its presence, and
application of appropriate sanctions. These three subjects are addressed in turn.
The primary difficulty is in distinguishing successful coordinated price eleva-
tion from ordinary competitive behavior, so that actual violations can be sanc-
tioned sufficiently often to achieve deterrence without unduly subjecting
competitive behavior to the risk of sanctions that produces concomitant chil-
ling effects.
2.1. Social Problem
Subsection 2.1.1 briefly reviews aspects of the theory of coordinated oligopoly
behavior that are most relevant for the analysis of detection. Subsection 2.1.2
addresses the welfare implications of oligopoly pricing. Static effects are fairly
familiar but dynamic effects are less well known and more subtle, and both are
important in understanding the possible adverse consequences of false posi-
tives. Subsection 2.1.3 presents a framework for assessment.
2.1.1. Coordinated Oligopoly Behavior9
Economists study coordinated oligopoly behavior using the theory of repeated
games.10 This theory aims to explain and predict oligopoly behavior that
had previously been the subject of rough, intuitive, and not entirely satis-
factory accounts (see, e.g., Bagwell & Wolinsky 2002, 1872–1873;
8 For further exploration, see Kaplow (2011a).
9 As the section heading signifies, the analysis addresses coordinated oligopolistic price elevation. It
has long been understood that, under certain conditions, even if the firms are unable to coordinate,
price will exceed marginal cost (even though it will continue to fall short of the monopoly level). See,
e.g., Friedman (1986, 54–57); Kaplow & Shapiro (2007, 1083–1086); and Shapiro (1989, 333–356).
For discussion of the implications of unilateral exercises of market power for policy toward coordi-
nated oligopolistic price elevation, see Kaplow (2011a, sec. V.C). Unilateral price elevation is also
explored (although with a different focus) in Markovits (1974, 1975).
10 The seminal article is Friedman (1971). On modern game theory in general, see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994); on the application to oligopoly theory, see
Friedman (1986), Shapiro (1989), Tirole (1988, ch. 6), and Vives (1999, 301–323); and on the
connection to competition law, see Kaplow and Shapiro (2007, 1103–1121) and Whinston (2006,
ch. 2).
Winter 2011: Volume 3, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 455
 at Ernst M












Friedman 1971, 11).11 The relevant branch of the theory addresses what are
termed noncooperative games, which are those in which binding agreements
(such as might be enforced by a third party) are unavailable.12 Note that this
branch encompasses classic, explicit cartels (even written agreements) since
competition law renders them legally void; parties must rely on themselves to
enforce their arrangements. Unfortunately, the terminology can be confusing.
Within noncooperative games, it is common to refer to both cooperative and
noncooperative outcomes, a distinction that more closely tracks broader usage.
Successful coordinated oligopoly pricing is a cooperative outcome; rivalrous
competitive pricing is a noncooperative outcome (see, e.g., Friedman 1986, 20;
Fudenberg & Tirole 1991, xviii; and, for further discussion, Kaplow 2011c, sec.
IV.A.1). Importantly, cooperation in this sense describes the character of the
result, not the process by which the parties’ minds (speaking metaphorically for
firms) came to their mutual understanding. Thus, the theory focuses on what
price levels can be sustained, using what forms of punishment and so forth,
making no distinction based on what means of communication the parties may
have employed. That is, the same analysis is applicable to classic cartels and
to the most informal interdependence (see, e.g., Ku¨hn & Vives 1995, 43; Hall
2007, 1067).
The analysis of firms’ interactions employs repeated games because these can
capture the sort of strategic interaction that makes successful coordinated oli-
gopoly pricing possible. It is familiar that, otherwise, price competition will
yield the competitive outcome in a simple setting involving firms selling homo-
geneous products because firms that charge above marginal cost will be under-
cut by rivals.13 Unfortunately for society, firms sometimes are able to charge
supracompetitive prices, despite the absence of legally binding agreements.
The basic idea is that starting, say, at the industry-profit-maximizing (mon-
opoly) price, Pm , no firm will wish to cut its price to steal its rivals’ business if it
expects this act to induce its rivals to quickly cut their prices as well, perhaps
matching the first firm’s lower price and perhaps undercutting it. Whether,
when the dust settles, the price is somewhat lower than Pm or all the way down
to the competitive price, Pc , the prospective price cutter will be worse off.
As long as it does not expect to profit sufficiently in the short run (before
11 Although the underlying story has long played a prominent role in competition law commentary
and court opinions, the modern theory that makes it more precise has been virtually absent in these
arenas. See Kaplow (2011c, 778–779 n.224).
12 Cooperative games are those in which externally enforceable binding agreements are possible, and
the analysis focuses on what agreement parties would reach.
13 For more formal discussion that raises subtleties not central to the present task, see, for example,
Shapiro (1989, 344–346) and Tirole (1988, 212–218).
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rivals cut their prices as well) to make up for the sacrifice of profits in the long
run, it will adhere to the price of Pm. Note that this logic applies regardless of
whether each firm’s expectation about others’ reactions arises from their
mutual appreciation of the situation or as a consequence of direct discussion
of the matter.
Similar logic can explain how the price might rise to Pm in the first place,
whether it starts at Pc or some intermediate level. A firm may be willing to brave
a price increase if it expects (again, whether by conjecture or as a result of
explicit discourse) that its rivals will reciprocate. If its rivals indeed cooperate
by matching the price increase, the firms will all be better off thereafter, sup-
posing that, by the logic of the preceding paragraph, the price increase can be
sustained. As long as the first firm does not lose much profit in the interim (due
to any delay in others’ reactions), the long-run gain will make the venture
worthwhile. Moreover, the firm will expect its rivals to follow quickly because
they understand (again, either because of their grasp of the circumstances or
through prior dialogue) that delay will be taken as defection, leading the initi-
ator quickly to drop its price back to the preexisting level.
Modern game theoretic literature makes the foregoing intuition more rigor-
ous and extends it along a number of dimensions.14 Perhaps the most important
elaboration for present purposes concerns the problem that oligopolistic firms
face in detecting defections in markets where each firm’s prices are not readily
observed—a challenge first explored in depth by Stigler (1964) (see also Spence
1978). In this setting, firms might be able to infer that someone has cheated
from a fall in sales of their own products, and in simple models this information
would be sufficient. But suppose as well that buyers’ demand fluctuates in ways
firms cannot observe, raising the possibility that a decline in a firm’s sales might
have been due to cheating or instead to less favorable market conditions. In the
presence of such uncertainty, firms need to choose a strategy that trades off
rapid, sufficiently harsh punishment of actual cheating—in order to deter it
effectively—and avoidance of price wars when there was no actual cheating but
just a period of unusually low demand. In models of this problem, coordinated
oligopoly pricing may still be possible, but it is less effective; there will be oc-
casional price wars even when no cheating has occurred. It has also been sug-
gested that this more complicated scenario accords with what has actually
occurred in some markets characterized by coordinated pricing.15
14 See generally sources cited supra note 10.
15 See, e.g., Green & Porter (1984); Porter (1983a, 1983b); Baker (1989); Bresnahan (1987); Levenstein
(1997); and Shapiro (1989, 373–379); see also Perloff, Karp, & Golan (2007, 104) (finding the
evidence more mixed) and Slade (1990) (examining alternative price-war models).
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This extension and many others show how repeated games can be used to
provide more complete depictions of oligopolistic markets, which aids in exam-
ining such questions as whether conditions are conducive to successful coordi-
nated oligopoly pricing and whether it is occurring—both important inputs
into inferences about the existence of successful oligopolistic coordination, the
subject of section 2.2. Observe, as has been noted throughout, that there is no
direct relationship between the analysis in this subsection and whether firms’
success is achieved through pure interdependence or highly explicit communi-
cations. Both extreme, old-fashioned cartels (stripped only of the ability to
legally enforce their agreements) and plain interdependence, along with every-
thing in between, are analyzed as noncooperative games.16 Whether a pair of
strategies constitutes an equilibrium for two gas stations engaged in price sig-
naling with their price postings or having a discussion in a smoke-filled room
leading them to charge the monopoly price depends on precisely the same
calculation that compares the gain from defection with the lost future profits
due to the other firm’s response (see Whinston 2006, 21). Firms are assumed to
act in their own best interests, to maximize profits, in either case. If the gains
from cheating exceed the costs, it is supposed that a firm will cheat, and other-
wise not.17
2.1.2. Social Welfare Effects
Just as with the descriptive theory of coordinated oligopoly behavior, implica-
tions for social welfare do not fundamentally depend on the means by which
price elevation is accomplished, that is, whether it arises purely through recog-
nized interdependence or results from secret meetings at which detailed plans
are formulated. This rough equation is not particularly controversial; the point
is often acknowledged by those who favor a narrow price-fixing prohibition
(see, e.g., Areeda & Hovenkamp 2003, 226). As will be seen, although some
interesting differences do exist, they do not constitute substantial bases for
limiting the social concern about price fixing to that achieved by particular
means.
The core problem is that prices are higher than the competitive level. Such
high pricing reduces both consumer welfare and overall efficiency (total wel-
fare), the latter because choked-off sales are ones for which consumers’ will-
ingness to pay exceeds marginal cost, resulting in what is referred to as
16 For further elaboration, see Kaplow (2011c, sec. IV.B).
17 For qualifications and comments on their relevance, see Kaplow (2011c, sec. IV.B.3).
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deadweight loss.18 It is important for subsequent analysis to note an obvious
point: greater price elevations tend to be more harmful than small ones. This
point is especially true if the objective is total welfare because deadweight loss
rises disproportionately with price (the marginal loss equals price minus mar-
ginal cost, so this magnitude is greater when price is higher).
Static effects of oligopolistic price elevation are not necessarily limited to
allocative inefficiency (deadweight loss) and transfers from consumers to
producers. When oligopolistic firms raise price and accordingly reduce
output, their output may not be allocated efficiently among them. Note in
contrast that well-organized cartels can avoid this loss in production effi-
ciency if they let their more efficient members produce more in exchange for
transfer payments (Schmalensee 1987a). Accordingly, if oligopolistic price
elevation is to occur to a given extent, classic cartels may entail lower effi-
ciency costs than those that arise under pure interdependence or other less
formal schemes.
Oligopolistic price elevation and deterrence thereof may also have important
dynamic effects. As with static consequences, these effects do not as a first
approximation depend on the means by which coordination is achieved. The
dynamic effects considered here pertain to entry and inducing investment more
broadly.
Regarding entry, the literature identifies two competing effects (see, e.g.,
Mankiw & Whinston 1986). First, to the extent that prices are elevated above
marginal cost, there tends to be too much entry due to a business-stealing effect:
firms that enter obtain profits in part by diverting customers from incumbents,
whose lost surplus is not taken into account by entrants.19 Therefore, resources
wasted on excessive entry are an additional cost of price elevation. Importantly,
this effect is the only pertinent one with homogeneous goods industries, and
successful coordinated price elevation tends to be feasible primarily in indus-
tries with goods that are homogeneous or nearly so (a point consistent with the
18 For elaboration on the choice between consumer and total welfare as the appropriate criterion, see
Kaplow (2011b) and Kaplow and Shapiro (2007, 1165–1169) (examining the choice with regard to
the use of the efficiencies defense in horizontal merger assessment). Note that, even if consumers are
to be favored on distributive grounds (perhaps because they are on average less well off than
beneficiaries of firms’ profits), it does not make sense to ignore producers’ surplus entirely, and
in any event it tends to be advantageous to achieve distributive objectives more directly, through
redistributive taxation and transfers. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell (1994).
19 There is a qualification in cases in which industry demand is insufficient to support even one firm or
only one firm, although permitting effective monopoly pricing is not a good solution. Moreover, this
problem does not directly relate to whether a price-fixing prohibition should be limited to that
accomplished through certain means of communication. For elaboration, see Kaplow (2011c, sec.
II.B.2.a).
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facts of successful price-fixing prosecutions20). Hence, dynamic effects on entry
constitute a further social cost of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation in
most cases. Also, like static costs, it is one that rises with the extent of the price
elevation.
Second, to the extent that products are differentiated, there tends to be too
little entry because firms offering new products do not capture all of the surplus
generated by their contribution to product variety: firms consider only the
revenue they obtain, ignoring inframarginal consumers’ surplus. If this effect
is sufficiently large, the additional entry induced by price elevation is socially
beneficial. However, a substantial benefit from enhanced variety arises only
when differentiation is great, and in such industries coordinated price elevation
is unlikely to occur.
Entry is just one form that investment may take. Viewed more broadly,
elevated prices tend to reward whatever activities lead firms to be in a position
to charge prices in excess of marginal cost or to capture a larger share of the
market when doing so. That the allocative inefficiency of supracompetitive
pricing may often be outweighed by the dynamic gains from investment
induced by the prospect thereof constitutes the classic justification for granting
intellectual property rights. More broadly, competition regimes, such as that in
the United States, tend to tolerate monopoly pricing as long as the monopoly
position was obtained and is maintained through efficient behavior—produ-
cing products that consumers value and selling them at sufficiently attractive
prices—rather than through exclusionary practices.21 This permissive approach
is not without costs; ex ante incentives can be excessive, some ex ante invest-
ment is wasteful (rent seeking), and ex post payoffs, with accompanying allo-
cative inefficiency, may be greater than is necessary to induce investment.
Hence, intellectual property rights tend to be limited, and direct regulation
of monopoly is sometimes imposed. However, the judgment behind general
competition regimes is that, in other settings, monopolies should be permitted
to price as they wish, although the degree to which this view is accepted varies
across jurisdictions.
Price elevation achieved by interdependent behavior among oligopolists is
qualitatively different in this regard. Such price elevation does not reward firms
20 Examination of the lists of industries in Connor (2007, 136–153), Harrington (2006, 98–102), and
Hay and Kelley (1974, 29–38; also 24–25, 27) strongly suggests this to be true, and it is certainly true
of the large international cartels examined in Connor (2008).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (“The successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”); United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966) (referring to “the willful acquisition or maintenance
of that [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”).
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to the extent that they outperform their competitors but instead bestows profits
whose magnitude depends on firms’ success in refraining from competition.22
To be sure, the prospect of such rewards will induce a variety of ex ante invest-
ment behavior. In addition to entry, already discussed, firms might expand their
production capacities if they expect their capacities to have a positive effect on
their share of oligopoly rents, and this expansion would be wasteful if the
additional capacity would remain idle. Similarly, some activities, like advertis-
ing, may be zero-sum (to an extent). However, other types of investment are
socially valuable, such as product improvements and cost reductions. Yet, even
regarding the more useful activities, the reward from oligopoly pricing will
substantially reflect the firms’ ability to abstain from competition rather than
the merits of their prior investments. Thus, although permitting oligopolistic
price elevation may produce some dynamic gains, there is insufficient nexus to
justify price fixing (see Schmalensee 1989, 989).
Furthermore, oligopolistic pricing reduces potential dynamic benefits. When
some oligopolists are more efficient or offer products superior to those of
others, successfully coordinated pricing tends to dampen the tendency of
better firms to serve an increasing share of consumers. In addition, firms
may have less incentive to become more efficient and innovative in the first
place because they may not greatly benefit from such activity unless they will be
willing to defect from the interdependent arrangement, which they will be
reluctant to do if the oligopoly profit margin is substantial. Also, economies
of scale are not fully realized by successful oligopolists. Competition laws may
allow competing firms to merge or enter into joint ventures precisely because of
the potential to realize efficiencies; however, such actions are subject to review
in order to verify that anticompetitive effects are negligible or perhaps are
justified in light the efficiency gains. Coordinated oligopoly pricing incurs the
costs without producing these benefits. Finally, note once again that little of the
foregoing analysis suggests any direct distinction between unaided, albeit suc-
cessful oligopolistic interdependence and price elevation achieved through
explicit communication.
Some commentators have argued that plain interdependent oligop-
oly pricing should be permitted because price elevation by monopolists
22 In this regard, unilateral market power by oligopolists must be distinguished. See supra note 9.
Demsetz (1973, 3) offers a classic statement of the ex ante investment benefits of the prospect of
market power and their inapplicability to coordinated oligopolistic pricing:
To destroy such power when it arises may very well remove the incentive for progress.
This is to be contrasted with a situation in which a high rate of return is obtained
through a successful collusion to restrict output; here there is less danger to progress if
the collusive agreement is penalized.
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is legal.23 This claim is surprising. Competition law explicitly distinguishes and
subjects to tough sanctions the efforts by groups of firms to eliminate compe-
tition among themselves, in contrast to the price-elevating behavior of mon-
opolists. Moreover, this differential approach is well founded, as just explained.
A final reason the argument is puzzling is that the same logic would allow classic
cartels—indeed, even legally enforced cartel prices, for a monopolist can legally
force its employees to charge the price it commands—yet those advancing the
argument roundly condemn express price fixing.
2.1.3. Framework for Decision-making
If detection of successful oligopolistic interdependence was costless and per-
fect—that is, if all such behavior was detected and no innocent behavior was
misclassified—then the only question would be how to set sanctions optimally,
the subject of section 2.3. A substantial challenge remains because detection of
successful coordination is inevitably imperfect. Accordingly, a central ques-
tion—probably the most difficult and important one regarding price fixing—
is setting optimal proof burdens, that is, deciding how much of what sorts of
evidence in various contexts should be deemed sufficient for a finding of
liability.24
First, consider situations in which firms have in fact engaged in coordinated
oligopolistic price elevation. In such cases, the primary benefit of assessing
liability is deterrence; thus, the social cost of false negatives—failures to identify
price elevation that has in fact occurred—is the loss of deterrence. If it is pos-
sible to raise sanctions to make up for the detection deficit, there would be no
difficulty. There are, however, often limits to how high sanctions can be (firms
will be judgment proof beyond a certain point, for example), and there are also
costs in trying to identify and prosecute acts of price elevation. Therefore, it
seems likely that insisting on greater certainty of proof will involve some loss in
deterrence due to the larger portion of false negatives that result. Of additional
concern, the failure to detect oligopolistic price elevation will not be random. If
some methods of proof are allowed but others are restricted (they may be
disallowed or subject to high proof standards), it may well be that certain
groups of firms will be deterred and others not. Further raising the magnitude
of sanctions may primarily relate to the former, where there may be little or no
23 See, e.g., Areeda & Hovenkamp (2003, 232) (arguing against prohibition of pure interdependence
because such would be inconsistent with rules on monopoly); id. at 272 (same); and Turner (1962,
668) (“It would make no sense to deprive lawful oligopolists—those who have achieved their pos-
ition by accidental events or estimable endeavor—of the natural consequence of their position if the
lawful monopolist is left with his.”). But see Lopatka (1996, 854–855) (criticizing this view).
24 On the general question of how to set proof burdens optimally, see Kaplow (2012a, b).
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deterrence deficit, while having little effect on the latter. This point is particu-
larly relevant in assessing communications-based prohibitions that de facto or
de jure exonerate oligopolistic price elevation in certain settings. Obviously,
raising penalties will not deter groups of firms that are effectively immune from
them.
Second, consider firms that have not engaged in oligopolistic price elevation.
The prospect of sanctions may tend to chill (deter) beneficial activity in settings
in which firms anticipate that their actions generate a substantial risk of false
positives.25 It is familiar that, if certain medical procedures involve a high risk of
malpractice liability even when doctors behave properly, doctors may refrain
from such procedures even when they are beneficial. Commentators, courts, and
enforcement agencies that have been reluctant to take too aggressive an approach
toward price fixing seem implicitly to have this sort of concern in mind. The
point is especially significant if evidence that firms engaged in similar or identical
pricing behavior is taken to be proof of price fixing, or close to it, for such
behavior is the norm even among perfect competitors. Logically, such evidence
does not even begin to make the case for coordinated oligopolistic price eleva-
tion. What is required is to examine a range of evidence that is indeed probative,
taking advantage of multiple methods and using them in complementary ways.
The cost-benefit calculus in setting proof burdens involves a tradeoff of de-
terrence benefits and chilling costs. Demanding more compelling proof as a
predicate for assigning liability will tend to reduce both deterrence benefits and
the costs of chilling desirable behavior. Likewise, greater openness to less de-
finitive proof will enhance deterrence and amplify chilling effects. However, the
problem is more complicated because different channels of proof vary substan-
tially in their contribution to deterrence and their risk of chilling effects.
Ultimately, approaches toward different sorts of evidence need to be functional,
considering their benefits and costs directly, rather than employing formalistic
criteria that arbitrarily limit modes of proof or alter the target of inference in a
way that deviates from the social objective.
A direct approach assesses the importance of errors, both false positives and
false negatives, in terms of their effects on social welfare. More conventionally,
errors are often understood by reference to a formal legal criterion, even when
that criterion itself is chosen because it is a proxy indicator of which behavior
should be sanctioned.26 Most relevant for present purposes, the application of
25 False positives may also reduce the deterrence of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation because
the incremental difference in expected sanctions from engaging in coordinated pricing versus ab-
stention therefrom is reduced.
26 Another important difference is that errors are sometimes conventionally viewed as if they are
intrinsically bad, and the manner of specifying their weight is mysterious.
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punishment in a case in which no prohibited communications are demon-
strated may be regarded as a false positive. However, if certain classes of such
supposedly erroneous findings entail the assignment of liability in settings in
which coordinated oligopolistic price elevation in fact occurred—but without
the requisite communications, or at least without proper proof thereof—then
these so-called false positives would be desirable, not detrimental, in terms of
their effect on social welfare. Clearly, the prospect of such false positives that are
defined by reference to the formal legal rule will deter undesirable behavior, not
chill desirable behavior.
2.2. Detection
It is important to consider how detection would be undertaken following a
direct approach, both for its own sake and because this assessment will sharpen
the contrast with a communications-based prohibition in part 3. A direct in-
quiry asks whether coordinated oligopolistic price elevation27 has occurred and
not whether, if it has, it arose as a consequence of one or another means of
interfirm communications28—although, as will be discussed, such communi-
cations can be significant evidence bearing on whether successful coordination
has occurred. As noted, the social consequences of interdependent pricing do
not depend on this matter. Whether some methods of proof are to be privileged
above others should reflect analysis of the pertinent inferences and application
of the appropriate decision-making framework. Accordingly, any special or
exclusive relevance of interfirm communications, or any other indicator of
coordinated pricing for that matter, is not determined a priori but instead
needs to emerge from the functional analysis.
27 The emphasis is on coordinated elevations rather than on those that arise from the unilateral exercise
of market power, on which see note 9 and, for further exploration of its relevance to the present
problem, Kaplow (2011a, sec. V.C).
28 See, e.g., Jacquemin & Slade (1989, 452) (in discussing certain economic methods of identifying
collusion, they state: “[I]t is impossible to distinguish pure tacit collusion from . . . explicit cartel
agreements. What matters for the empirical estimates is the outcome and not the cause of non-
competitive pricing.”) and Porter & Zona (2008, 1071) (“As a matter of economics, it is difficult and
perhaps impossible to distinguish between [interdependent oligopoly, conscious parallelism, tacit
collusion, and explicit collusion] on the basis of outcomes alone.”). It is sometimes suggested that
one occasionally can tell whether elaborate, explicit communications have occurred, particularly
when behavior is unusually sharp and precise (e.g., secret bids that are identical down to many
digits). Even this point is overstated, for often the opposite inference might be made instead because,
the more explicit were the communications, the more readily firms could have orchestrated their
behavior so as to avoid leaving clear, visible tracks. See infra note 65.
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2.2.1.1. Means of Inferring Successful Oligopolistic Coordination.—There are
myriad means of inferring the existence of successful oligopolistic coordin-
ation,29 many of which are not independent of each other: some may be sim-
ultaneously present or mutually reinforcing. A converse is likewise important:
regarding some factors that imply coordination, their absence may often negate
its existence, where absence should be understood as not merely constituting
ambiguity and difficulty of proof but rather demonstration of nonexistence.
Despite the overlap and interrelationship, it is useful to group indicators into
two clusters: pricing patterns and price elevation. Certain pricing patterns may
indicate successful oligopolistic coordination or a breakdown that implies its
prior existence. Given the long history of confusion on this subject, it is best to
begin by emphasizing that the presence of parallel pricing and other shared
behavior is not usually a symptom for the simple reason that ordinary com-
petitive interaction also has this character. Indeed, when competition is vibrant,
most pricing and other behavior are parallel. When firms’ costs increase, their
prices rise and quantities fall. When demand increases, firms’ prices and quan-
tities both rise. When technology changes, consumers’ locations or tastes shift,
regulations are modified, and so forth, competitors react similarly, even iden-
tically. The goal is to distinguish successful oligopolistic interdependence from
competitive, independent, rivalrous behavior. As a logical matter, traits, such as
parallel pricing, that are shared by both categories are not useful in drawing the
distinction. Instead, analysis should focus on behavior that is consistent with
oligopolistic interdependence and inconsistent with competition, which favors
liability, and behavior consistent with competition but inconsistent with inter-
dependence, which disfavors liability.
In considering pricing patterns that may support inferences of successful
oligopolistic coordination, it is useful to analyze three phases: raising prices
from a competitive to a supracompetitive level (or further escalating prices),
maintaining elevated prices, and price drops, notably, as a consequence of price
wars. Initiation or enhancement of oligopolistic price elevation may be marked
by a sharp price increase. However, such price increases can also happen in com-
petitive markets, most obviously when there is a cost shock, such as a sudden
increase in the price of oranges for grocery retailers or in the price of oil for
sellers of gasoline. Accordingly, it is also necessary to check for concurrent cost
increases or other changes, such as sudden shifts in demand, that may explain
the price increase. Additionally, signaling and jousting about price—such as
29 Prior treatments include Baker & Bresnahan (1992, 2008), Bresnahan (1989, 1997), Harrington
(2008), Kaplow & Shapiro (2007, 1087–1095), Perloff, Karp, & Golan (2007), Porter (2005), and
Posner (2001, 79–93).
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through sequential price changes, where firms await others’ reactions and then
proceed—may sometimes provide a basis for inferring oligopolistic elevation.
A difficulty is that sophisticated firms, aware of what inferences may be drawn
from their price moves, may instead adjust prices strategically in order to dis-
guise their coordinated behavior. Observe that more complex behaviors of this
sort might require more elaborate (and thus more explicit) communications
that may leave traces. Note that, if such camouflaging strategies are net helpful
to firms, an implication is that interdependent behavior involving little or no
direct interfirm communication may be easier to distinguish from competitive
behavior than is interdependent behavior implemented after more explicit
interchanges.
Another familiar point is that coordinated prices, and perhaps also market
shares, will tend to be stickier over time than are those of competitors. The main
reason is that, because coordination is difficult, frequent fine-tuning may be
avoided. In contrast, competitors do tend to respond quickly, and if changes are
frequent, often. There are other explanations for sticky prices, such as menu
costs (referring to the cost of changing prices per se), but in some settings such
costs are negligible or insufficient to explain the extent of stickiness.
Sudden, sharp price reductions are as suspicious as sudden, sharp price in-
creases, again, in the absence of corresponding changes in cost or demand.
Oligopolists do not ordinarily wish to drop the price, but such is sometimes
unavoidable. Price wars arise to punish cheaters or when firms experience a loss
of customers and thus must act on the assumption that cheating occurred even
though a decline in demand that is not yet evident might have been the cause
(as explained in subsection 2.1.1). If prices fall precipitously, without any ex-
ogenous change of corresponding magnitude, the preexisting price probably
involved coordinated elevation.30
Another strategy to detect elevation is to examine prices themselves. A logic-
ally straightforward way to determine whether price exceeds a competitive level,
marginal cost, is to compare price and marginal cost directly. While price is
often easy to determine, marginal cost may be quite difficult to measure in
many settings. This challenge is familiar in competition law enforcement, often
being confronted when assessing market power31 and also at issue in predatory
pricing disputes32 and in some other contexts. Underestimating marginal cost
30 The use of price cuts to enforce coordinated oligopolistic price elevation has motivated proposals to
further take advantage of this feature. See Bishop (1983) and Sagi (2008).
31 If measuring existing (that is, exercised) market power, the problem is tantamount to measuring
price-cost margins. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shapiro (2007, 1079–1080).
32 It is common to inquire whether price is below cost (although the appropriate notion of cost is not
always defined). See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
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and thus producing false positives can occur as a consequence of excluding
costs as fixed that are really variable (perhaps equipment could be rented or
sold), ignoring common costs (which may actually need to be raised to support
additional output of the product in question), or failing to recognize that
marginal costs may rise steeply when output is close to capacity. In response,
enforcers could consciously err in the opposite direction (treating more costs as
variable costs of the product in question, for example) and require demonstra-
tion of a more significant elevation of price above measured marginal cost.
Another approach relies on comparing prices for the same product sold to
different purchasers. Prices might be compared across markets; notably, geo-
graphical price differences may indicate supracompetitive pricing in regions
with higher prices. Similarly, different prices charged to different customers
in a single market—that is, the presence of price discrimination—may indicate
the existence of market power. Both methods have their limitations, such as the
need to attend to possible cost differences.
A different way to identify successful oligopolistic coordination is to examine
whether ordinary pricing behavior (that is, aside from episodes of commencing
or terminating coordination) responds to changes in demand and cost in the
same manner as would pricing by competitors or somewhat (or entirely) like
pricing by a monopolist (see, e.g., Bresnahan 1989, 1012; 1997, 71). A substan-
tial body of econometric research since the 1980s is designed to measure the
exercise of market power using such a strategy (see sources cited supra note 29).
This work represents a significant advance in market power measurement, but
it is hardly a panacea; the techniques often require strong assumptions about
the structure of demand and cost that it may not be possible to test directly (see,
e.g., Perloff, Karp, & Golan 2007, 42, 70–71, 91).
The foregoing list is hardly exhaustive. It is clear that successful oligopolistic
coordination resulting in price elevation has a number of features that distin-
guish it from ordinary competition and that there exist techniques for identify-
ing these differences. On the other hand, these differences will not always be
apparent, and sometimes alternative explanations will be available that them-
selves may be difficult to assess.
A different sort of evidence concerns the use of facilitating practices: acts that
make it easier to engage in oligopolistic coordination (see, e.g., Buccirossi 2008;
Posner 2001, 86–87, 88–89, 91–93). Commonly discussed examples include
advance price announcements, discussions at trade association meetings, prod-
uct standardization and suppression of quality competition, cross-ownership,
(1993). Note that if true marginal cost is above measured cost, which as the text to follow indicates is
the more likely error, predation tests are too lax but determinations of the existence of coordinated
oligopolistic price elevation are too strict.
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most-favored customer clauses, and price-matching guarantees. Indeed, explicit
interfirm communications, taken by many to be determinative of what consti-
tutes a price-fixing agreement, can also be viewed as facilitating practices (see
Kaplow 2011c, sec. II.B.2).
Facilitating practices may be relevant in two ways.33 First, their use provides a
basis for inferring the existence of oligopolistic coordination. This inference is
sensible when there exists no other plausible explanation for the practice.
Second, facilitating practices may themselves be made a basis for liability.
Again, one must determine whether there are other explanations for use of
the practices, and, if there are, any benefits must be weighed against the com-
petitive risks.34
2.2.1.2. Conduciveness of Conditions.—An assessment of the degree to which
industry conditions in a particular setting are conducive to successful oligop-
olistic coordination can sharpen the accuracy of inferences on the ultimate
question of whether such coordination is occurring. This idea is especially
important for present purposes because the relevance of conduciveness under
a communications-based prohibition may be radically different—arguably the
opposite in many settings, as elaborated in sections 3.4 and 3.5. Indeed, perhaps
the greatest potential distinction between the two approaches toward price
fixing concerns this divergence in the use of evidence on conduciveness.
To begin, conduciveness may be seen as a necessary condition for successful
coordination. If coordinated oligopoly pricing is impossible under the circum-
stances, we can confidently infer that it is not taking place. Similarly, if condi-
tions are unconducive, success seems unlikely.35 A key qualification is that the
investigator or adjudicator may be mistaken about how unconducive the con-
ditions actually are. Firms ordinarily have a better grasp of industry conditions
and of their own ability to succeed in spite of them than will an outsider. Thus,
if one sees clear attempts to coordinate or strong evidence that oligopolistic
coordination is successful, the better inference is that the mistake lies not with
the firms’ analysis of conditions but rather with the observer’s.
33 The nature of facilitating practices is also relevant to whether conditions are conducive to collusion,
the subject of the next subsection.
34 See also infra section 4.2 (discussing how a more limited prohibition on coordinated oligopoly
pricing may require a stricter and thus more costly regulation of facilitating practices).
35 One reservation to this argument concerns ill-conceived attempts. It is often helpful to punish
attempts even if they fail or, importantly, when it is difficult to know whether they have succeeded.
Nevertheless, the deterrence benefit of such punishment is likely to be limited when considering
realms in which success is difficult or impossible in any event, and we should be more skeptical that
an attempt occurred in unconducive circumstances. See Kaplow (2011a, sec. V.B).
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It should be clear as well that inferences about conditions should influence
inferences about successful coordination and vice versa. If we are highly con-
fident about one set of inferences, then we should adjust, perhaps significantly,
our inferences about the other. As mentioned, if conditions seem quite uncon-
ducive, we should be more skeptical of evidence that may otherwise lead us to
believe that oligopolistic price elevation took place. However, if evidence on the
latter is quite strong, then we should doubt evidence that conditions are highly
unconducive. Often, there will be nontrivial uncertainty surrounding both
matters. In addition, even when there is reasonable confidence regarding con-
duciveness, it may be that it is at an intermediate level, readily admitting the
possibility that coordination would succeed and that it would fail. In such cases,
we would need to rely primarily on the strength of the evidence bearing on
success to determine whether oligopolistic coordination took place.
Although conduciveness at some level is a necessary condition to success, it is
not a sufficient condition, and this is so even when conditions are extremely
conducive. The primary reason is that deterrence may be effective. Even the
easiest task will not be undertaken if the expected penalty for doing so is suf-
ficiently great. In a well-functioning regime, coordinated oligopolistic price
elevation may be deterred in most instances. Put another way, unless one be-
lieves that the legal system is a substantial failure, one cannot assume that highly
conducive conditions in and of themselves imply a significant likelihood of
coordinated price elevation.
Conduciveness is also important with regard to the magnitude of deterrence
benefits and chilling costs. When conditions are quite unconducive, any suc-
cessful oligopolistic coordination is likely to result in price elevations that are
small and short-lived. In addition, chilling costs are likely to be greater in such
situations because these industries are reasonably likely to be competitive.
There are a large number of markets where conditions are quite unconducive
to successful coordinated price elevation. If such cases are not screened out,
they might give rise to many false positives. On the other hand, when conditions
are highly conducive, undeterred firms may succeed in significant, long-lasting
price elevations, whereas chilling costs may be less worrisome since highly
competitive behavior is less likely. Accordingly, insisting on moderately or
perhaps highly conducive conditions seems sensible.36
The present discussion will not elaborate the conditions themselves because
the subject has received extensive attention in the literature (see, e.g., Connor
36 As will be discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5 on the paradox of proof, some views of more traditional
approaches to liability, which emphasize explicit interfirm communications, may have the opposite
implication regarding conduciveness, which for the reasons just given in the text serves to reduce
rather than maximize social welfare.
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2008, 32–42; Hay & Kelley 1974, 14–17; Kaplow & Shapiro 2007, 1108–1121;
Posner 2001, 69–79; Vives 1999, 306–310) and is not particularly controversial.
Moreover, the particulars are not very germane to the comparison of the two
approaches (although they are pertinent to how both are implemented since
conduciveness is highly relevant under both). Some of the familiar factors are
numbers of firms and market concentration, product heterogeneity, the extent
of asymmetry across firms, the transparency of prices, the structure of the buyer
side of the market, demand uncertainty, and the coordinating group’s market
power.
2.2.2. Internal Evidence and Communications
For virtually any factor examined in subsection 2.2.1, there is corresponding
internal evidence. In addition to hard evidence—for example, invoices or other
records indicating prices charged and quantities sold—there is a variety of other
information. Some of it may directly convey firms’ thinking (strategy or deci-
sion memos, notes of meetings, internal policy pronouncements), and much
more will convey aspects indirectly (cost and marketing data being suggestive of
firms’ beliefs about marginal cost and demand). After all, a substantial portion
of higher-level managers’ time, as well as efforts throughout particular depart-
ments, is devoted to information gathering, analysis, and decision-making.
These activities generate all manner of notes, reporting up and down chains
of command, memos, communications, meetings, and so forth. They relate to
what firms know or believe as well as to the reasoning behind their decisions.
For example, when a firm suddenly increases its price, it will have reasons,
usually supported by its own evidence. If there is a corresponding increase in
cost, this will be reflected in the firm’s internal cost data and projections as well
as in its decision-making process. When price suddenly drops, similar internal
information and activity will also be involved. Whether the firm is a secret price
cutter, is responding to perceived cheating by others, or is reflecting changes in
cost or demand, the information and rationale will be reflected internally. More
broadly, if firms are interacting interdependently, we would expect internal
discussions and other traces to differ from the situation in which firms
behave as competitors who take rivals’ behavior as given.37 Note that omissions
can also be revealing. For example, a lack of new data or of discussion about
37 For example, in some court cases (see Kaplow 2011c, 747–748 n.158), there is evidence of firms’
“understanding” with others, viewing competitors as “friends,” and so forth, all of which suggest
interdependence. Interestingly, courts referring to such indicators tend to view them as evidence of
express communications in contrast to pure interdependence, a logical error since pure inter-
dependence involves a meeting of the minds and resulting mutual understanding that is equivalent
to that existing in a classic cartel; the difference is in how that understanding comes about. See infra
section 3.3.
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changes in demand makes a sharp demand shift an unlikely explanation for a
price move. In contrast, if a new product proposal is rejected because studies
detail how the firm lacks production capability or how consumers are uninter-
ested, suppressing heterogeneity is an unlikely explanation.
There are important limitations in relying on internal evidence from firms.
First, since a large firm is a group of many individuals with complex, over-
lapping, and sometimes conflicting duties, it can be difficult to determine what
a firm knows or what reasoning explains its actions. Many decisions are based
on soft information or are made despite seemingly contradictory information,
perhaps because the information is seen to be unreliable, because there are
overriding considerations, or because of incompetence. There may exist intern-
al disagreement or misunderstanding. Firm politics may also play a role, re-
flecting that employees are not perfect agents of the owners. A second concern is
that lawyers or others will anticipate the liability implications of firms’ know-
ledge, decision-making, and actions and therefore will sanitize or distort the
various clues to be found within the firm.
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that some substantial and fairly reliable con-
clusions will often be possible to reach. Firms cannot operate while lacking even
an approximate sense of their costs and market demand, without any rationale
for their actions. If successful oligopolistic coordination significantly elevates
prices for extended periods of time, there may well be substantial internal in-
dicators. Similarly, if no such behavior has occurred, there may be evidence
inconsistent with hypothesized coordinated price elevation. Relatedly, it is dif-
ficult for a team of lawyers or others to reach broadly and deeply into a large
corporation, controlling how myriad individuals speak, write, email, and other-
wise behave. Furthermore, any such process that is not limited to a handful of
key agents may itself leave incriminating tracks. Also, even if no individuals
made explicit reference to forbidden activity, most of the information con-
sidered here would remain, notably that concerning firms’ costs, demand, stra-
tegic decision-making, and so forth. Firms’ task at hiding their tracks is even
more daunting because we are examining the possibility of coordinated behav-
ior. Consider how difficult it would be for multiple firms to fabricate consistent
stories, which could survive scrutiny, about a cost shock that had not in fact
occurred. In contrast, if there really was a cost shock, and accordingly the firms’
simultaneous price increase was an ordinary response of competitors, substan-
tial corroborating material would likely have been generated in the ordinary
course of business by each of the firms, and it would be consistent with external
indicators.
Interfirm communications constitute an additional source of evidence when
making inferences about whether successful oligopolistic coordination has
taken place—that is, (even) under a direct approach that does not make liability
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contingent on particular prohibited communications. Indeed, when docu-
mented and specific, they are often excellent evidence. Interfirm communica-
tions contribute to our understanding of what firms have done and why. Note
that public interfirm communications, ranging from advance price announce-
ments to commentary on industry conditions, are not hidden and may be as
revealing as secret discussions.38 Even when they are directed toward the public,
sequential advance announcements arriving at a consensus price may indicate
what firms are doing. In this respect, they may supplement information from
price moves themselves; for example, if an industry-wide price increase is due to
a common cost shock and firms are behaving competitively, they will have less
of a need to feel out their rivals before raising their prices.
Second, interfirm communications can serve as an important facilitating
device and thus support an inference of coordinated pricing. These might in-
clude public statements—advance price announcements, predictions about in-
dustry demand or costs, and open discussions of various matters at trade
association meetings—as well as secret meetings. These communications may
help firms reach a consensus and be especially useful when more complex
understandings are required, perhaps because of product heterogeneity. In
addition, direct interchange may help identify and coordinate the punishment
of cheaters. Moreover, some forms of interfirm communications are an attract-
ive enforcement target because there is little social cost if firms are deterred
from engaging in them. Secret meetings in hotel rooms come to mind. For other
communications, such as public price announcements, trade association activ-
ities, and participation in standard setting or joint ventures, there are varying
degrees of possible benefits that need to be considered.39
Consequently, interfirm communications of all sorts can be important in
making reliable inferences. It is also clear that their reliability may be enhanced,
perhaps significantly, by combining them with the other evidence considered
throughout this part. Accordingly, evidence of interfirm communications
should be viewed as a weapon in the detection arsenal but not as the be all
and end all.
A related question is how probative is the lack of explicit, detailed interfirm
communications. First, because firms attempt to keep these secret and may
succeed in doing so, a failure to find such communications is hardly conclusive
that they did not occur. Second, oligopolistic coordination is sometimes
38 Note that, if public interchanges were per se legal, firms could simply move their meetings from
hotel rooms to joint press conferences.
39 In this regard, as section 4.2 explains, a legal regime that is more aggressive toward successful
oligopolistic coordination may be able to be more relaxed about activities that have social benefits
but also might facilitate price elevation (which can be downplayed if it is independently deterred).
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possible without elaborate communications. Regarding both points, there is an
important interaction with the conduciveness of conditions. When conditions
are most conducive—particularly when the number of firms is small—explicit
interfirm communications are both less essential and more difficult to detect.40
This suggests that, when the danger of oligopolistic price elevation is greatest,
we should be less bothered by the lack of such evidence. Similarly, when firms’
coordination problem is highly complex and likely to require extensive, explicit
communications among large numbers of individuals, the absence of direct (or
strong indirect) evidence that any such communications took place would
make an inference of successful oligopolistic coordination notably weaker.41
An additional point, which will be explored further in sections 3.4 and 3.5, is
that it generally makes little sense in cases where no secret interfirm commu-
nications are directly detected to attempt to infer through the use of circum-
stantial evidence whether they have taken place. Since the reason we care about
these communications is that they further illuminate other evidence, nothing is
added by this process. Stated abstractly, if evidence E1, E2, and E3 give rise to a
probabilistic inference that internal communication C occurred, any implica-
tion from the set E1, E2, E3, and C about successful oligopolistic coordination
can be no stronger than what one could have inferred directly from E1, E2, and
E3 alone.
42 As we will see, the process of attempting to infer specific sorts of
communication from circumstantial evidence is complicated and uncertain,
and it generally entails having already reached a judgment on whether coordi-
nated oligopolistic price elevation has occurred.43 Thus, the supplemental in-
ference about communication is of little use, very costly, and also highly
distracting.
2.3. Sanctions
Fines are widely used to penalize price fixing, supplemented by damages in the
United States and to a lesser extent in other jurisdictions. Moreover, basic law
enforcement theory (see, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell 2007) suggests that their use is
often desirable, for monetary sanctions tend not to be costly in themselves (in
contrast to imprisonment and injunctions), they deter behavior (which
40 See the elaboration and qualifications in subsection 3.4.5.
41 As will be seen in subsection 3.4.2, the logic in this paragraph differs greatly from that implied under
the commonly advanced view.
42 Even when direct evidence of C would strengthen the ultimate inference, if the only evidence of C is
due to the inference from E1, E2, and E3, nothing is added.
43 The ultimate irony arises when defendants grant this point—that is, that they are elevating
price—and use the ease of coordination to negate the existence of particular sorts of communica-
tion. Such is the paradox of proof, elaborated in sections 3.4 and 3.5.
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injunctions alone do not), and they may be calibrated to the extent of harm
caused and the likelihood of detection. Regarding the latter, the general pre-
scription is that, ideally, expected sanctions should be set equal to expected
external harm, so fines or damages should equal actual harm multiplied by the
inverse of the likelihood of successful detection. Because oligopolistic firms
attempt to keep their price coordination secret, this latter point is important
in the present setting, and this is the rationale for employing treble damages in
private lawsuits in the United States—which, note, are in addition to any fines
and prison terms imposed by government enforcers. Additionally, because
chilling costs are of greatest concern when industries are actually competitive,
which will tend to be situations in which apparent (although mistakenly iden-
tified) price elevations are small, correspondingly lower sanctions in cases with
low measured price increments provide a useful if incomplete safety valve.
Therefore, it is important to attempt to measure harm reasonably well when
determining the magnitude of fines or other sanctions. Fortunately, much (but
not nearly all) evidence used to detect successful oligopolistic price elevation
also provides a basis for estimating its magnitude (see, e.g., Baker & Bresnahan
1992, 15). And when it is necessary to inquire further into the magnitude of
price elevation for purposes of setting the level of sanctions, it makes sense to
use this information to refine inferences regarding liability.
Although the core deterrence logic is simple and familiar, it is worth empha-
sizing because it seems that many competition law commentators fail to ap-
preciate it, as discussed below, despite Posner’s (1969, 1588–1593) clear
presentation of the basic idea in his seminal article decades ago. Whatever
methods firms might use to achieve coordinated oligopolistic price elevation,
firms’ decision-making calculus changes if they expect to be subject to sanc-
tions. If they anticipate a large gain from successful oligopolistic coordination
and no penalties, they will expend great effort to accomplish it. However, if
there are sanctions and their expected level exceeds expected profits from co-
ordination, then they will voluntarily forgo such efforts and aim to ensure that
their employees do not engage in this activity. The logic is no different for, say,
the application of a corrective tax to firms that pollute. In imposing the tax, the
government simply charges firms for their pollution; how pollution is reduced
is up to the firms. With price fixing, the optimal degree is ordinarily zero, and if
expected sanctions are equal to harm to others and thus exceed any profits, that
is the level firms will choose.
The use of imprisonment is socially costly: resources are consumed in run-
ning the system and the loss to imprisoned individuals is not matched by any
direct social offset (unlike fines, which are transfers). Accordingly, imprison-
ment is not optimally employed unless monetary sanctions are insufficient.
Imprisonment, which is used in price-fixing enforcement, especially in the
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United States, can nevertheless be important. Detection is difficult, which may
require for adequate deterrence a level of fines that exceeds firms’ assets, and
firms cannot always readily control employees, some of whom may have in-
centives to violate the law (for example, to receive a bonus or obtain a promo-
tion due to higher current profits) even when violations are against the interest
of the firm as a whole.
Injunctions are notably different from fines and imprisonment. Most im-
portantly, they do not by themselves achieve deterrence. Firms would be happy
to elevate prices for as long as they could get away with it—which may be a long
time given detection difficulties and also the time delay involved in adjudica-
tion—if the only cost upon apprehension is the need to abstain in the future. (If
the only legal consequence of theft, murder, or tax evasion was the possibility of
being ordered not to repeat the violation in the future, crime may become
rampant.) Furthermore, if fines and damages (and imprisonment) are to be
employed, why is there a further need for an injunction? After all, when the
other sanctions succeed at deterrence, whether to impose injunctions becomes
moot. Also, injunctions are parasitic on the other sanctions because firms have
little incentive to abide by injunctions unless they fear penalties from doing so.
If those penalties, in turn, are essentially the same as those for the underlying
violation, it is not clear what an injunction adds with regard to deterring future
violations. A higher sanction or use of more summary proceedings for repeat
violations might be employed, but such could be done in any event. Injunctions
do differ from other remedies in that, instead of attempting to induce compli-
ance, they may implement it directly, such as by an agency regulating firms’
prices going forward or restructuring an industry so as to make conditions no
longer conducive to successful oligopolistic coordination. Such remedies, of
course, are often quite costly in themselves.
Consistent with the view that injunctions are not important in the present
setting, it is not apparent that they are heavily used.44 Nevertheless, many
commentators seem to be fixated on their centrality—often implicitly, in
arguing against a direct prohibition on coordinated oligopolistic price elevation
on the ground that it would be difficult to fashion an injunction commanding
44 For example, exploration of the web site and publications on workload and enforcement of the U.S.
Department of Justice Antitrust Division reveals substantial information on fines and imprison-
ment, but not (that this author could readily locate) on injunctions. Examination of competition law
treatises in the United States and other research does not reveal significant attention devoted to
injunctions for price fixing. It appears that injunctions are used with regard to explicit, open prac-
tices, such as when an organization requires price fixing or employs particular facilitating devices.
Most U.S. Department of Justice cases that involve price fixing are criminal, and injunctions do not
appear to be employed.
Winter 2011: Volume 3, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 475
 at Ernst M












compliance.45 The objection is that abstention from coordinated behavior,
when conditions are conducive to success, would somehow be unnatural or
irrational and hence futile to require, and the asserted implication is that liabil-
ity must be limited to the commission of specified acts, such as particular forms
of interfirm communication.46
45 See, e.g., Kaysen & Turner (1959, 143–144) (“By the very fact that we are dealing with prac-
tices—that is, conduct—the appropriate remedy is always the injunctive remedy: cessation of the
practice.”); Turner (1962, 669); and Baker (1996, 47).
46 See, e.g., Areeda & Hovenkamp (2003, 150) (“In the preceding hypothetical, however, we cannot
reasonably expect firm L to refrain from increasing its prices when it feels that the market would
accept them, or the others to refrain from following.”); id. at 231 (cannot employ “a legal rule [that]
tells the oligopolist to close its eyes to the immediate and direct market impact of its own output
choices, as well as to the subsequent market impact of its rivals’ probable responses to its own output
decision”); id. at 232 (cannot employ a rule that “tells each firm to ignore the profit-maximizing
signals emitted by the market”); Chamberlin (1929, 65) (“Each is forced by the situation itself to
take into account the policy of his rival in determining his own . . . .”); Dabbah (2004, 268) (cannot
make illegal firms’ behavior that constitutes profit maximization); Elhauge & Geradin (2007,
801–802) (referring to “the problem that firms [in] oligopolistic markets cannot avoid knowing
their prices are interdependent when they set their prices, so that it would be hard to define any
prohibition in a way that tells firms how to behave”); id. at 835 (“If so, how could one define the
offense in a way that oligopolists could avoid behaving illegally? Is it practicable to ask them to
ignore the reality of their price interdependence when making their pricing decisions?”);
Hovenkamp (2005, 128) (objecting to the condemnation of interdependent behavior standing
alone because “implicit in condemnation of any practice under the antitrust laws is that the de-
fendant was obliged to behave in some other way than it did”); Monti (2001, 145) (arguing that
remedies are infeasible as long as there exists a rational economic explanation for the oligopolists’
behavior); Scherer & Ross (1990, 342) (“How should oligopolists change their behavior so as to
avoid breaking the law? Must they begin ignoring their interdependence in pricing decisions, when
to do so would be irrational?”); Stroux (2004, 114) (“Imposing competitors to disregard their
rival[s]’ behaviour would obviously be nonsense, as it would require them to behave irrationally.”);
Turner (1962, 666) (“Particularly is this so when the behavior involved, setting the
‘profit-maximizing’ price in light of all market facts, is not only legally acceptable but vitally neces-
sary to make competitive markets function as they are supposed to function.”); Ivo Van Bael &
Jean-Francois Bellis (2005, 51) (“[S]ometimes it is only rational commercial behaviour which makes
competitors align their conduct. In such a case undertakings should not be punished for doing what
makes sense commercially.”); and White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy (1968, 5) (“antitrust
law . . . cannot order the several firms to ignore each other’s existence”). Interestingly, most of these
references postdate Posner’s work that is cited in the following note, yet they seem to ignore its basic
point with regard to the deterrent effect of sanctions altering what firms would find rational to do.
In addition to the fact that sanctions change firms’ incentives, the sometimes-expressed position that
interdependence is inevitable that is reflected in the aforementioned views—see also, e.g., Kaysen & Turner
(1959, 27) (suggesting that recognized interdependence is “extremely likely” when concentration is even
moderately high)—is not empirically well grounded. Evidence on successful prosecutions, see sources cited
supra note 20, reveals the use of explicit and sometimes highly elaborate direct communications even in
very concentrated industries, and industrial organization research for decades on the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm implies that successful coordination often fails even in highly
concentrated industries. See, e.g., Perloff, Karp, & Golan (2007, 33–34) and Schmalensee (1989, 971, 976,
988; 1987b). Moreover, most commentators who have offered an opinion on the subject (overlapping in
part with those cited just above in this note) assert that coordination is actually quite difficult in the absence
of explicit communications. See infra subsection 3.4.4 and note 76. Accordingly, both the empirical basis
and apparent consensus behind the premise for this common argument seem on reflection to be lacking.
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This complaint, however, is quite puzzling since the response is both obvious
and has been offered before. The point is simple: what is natural and rational
depends on whether sanctions are imposed. It may be natural and rational for a
hungry shopper to steal an apple, for a youth with public artistic impulses to
create graffiti, or for a greedy manager to embezzle funds—that is, if such were
legal. However, if these activities are illegal and subject to heavy sanctions,
engaging in them becomes irrational. Oligopolistic price coordination is no
different. If there are no sanctions, a firm may find it attractive to follow a
leader’s price increase and to avoid undercutting the industry’s supracompeti-
tive price because of the allure of sustained supracompetitive profits. But if such
acts are associated with sufficiently high penalties, then the firm would find it
irrational to follow the leader’s price increase and profitable to undercut ele-
vated prices.47 Therefore, the question of whether a command to refrain from
coordinated oligopolistic pricing—whether issued through a particular injunc-
tion or by the law more generally—will succeed depends on the adequacy of
expected sanctions. This adequacy, in turn, depends on detection and on the
magnitude of sanctions. It does not depend on firms’ managers possessing some
mystical ability to engage in a form of reasoning heretofore unknown to
humankind.
In addition to the choice of sanctions, a complete analysis of optimal en-
forcement must consider additional issues (see, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell 2007),
but they are set aside for present purposes. Among them are whether private
suits should be used instead of or in addition to public enforcement, how
private enforcement should be operated (permission of class actions, allocation
of attorneys’ fees, determination of who should be permitted to sue), how
obligations for fines or damages should be allocated among the firms (particu-
larly if the defendants do not constitute the entire market or if some are judg-
ment proof), the strategic use of leniency policy, deciding which firms should be
liable at all, and liability for attempts.
3. COMMUNICATIONS-BASED PROHIBIT ION
Part 2 sketches how to construct a regime to address coordinated oligopolistic
price elevation. The means of detection and determination of sanctions follow
47 See Posner (1969, 1592 n.80) (“All I am arguing is that a deliberate restriction of output by com-
petitors is conduct that rational men can avoid—and will avoid if it is made sufficiently costly to
them to engage in it.”); Posner (2001, 97–98) (“Tacit collusion is not an unconscious state. . . . The
threat of a damages judgment for supracompetitive pricing will influence their pricing decisions;
what would be irrational would be for the oligopolists to ignore such a threat.”); and Posner &
Easterbrook (1981, 333).
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from the statement of the social problem to be addressed rather than from
statutory interpretation or some other external command. The problem is a
challenging one because it is difficult to detect successful coordination with
sufficient frequency to achieve substantial deterrence while limiting false posi-
tives so as to contain the cost of chilling desirable behavior. There are a variety
of techniques available, and it seems best to employ them in combination, with
the relative importance depending on the strength of particular evidence and
other circumstances of a given case or type of case.
The approach that emerges appears to be quite different from what most
commentators believe that the law does and should require. That alternative,
often characterized as involving a requirement of express or explicit agreement,
tends to focus on a subset48 of interfirm communications in determining li-
ability.49 A priori, this scheme seems unlikely to be best or even nearly so.
Because it asks the wrong question—whether there exists an “agreement”
rather than whether harm is likely—it misuses many types of evidence that
are probative of the existence of the social harm in question, privileging a
small portion that will often be unavailable and sometimes be unreliable. (Of
course, when it is available and reliable, it receives heavy weight under the more
catholic approach toward evidence presented in section 2.2.) Moreover, as will
be developed in sections 3.4 and 3.5, it takes one category of evidence, on the
conduciveness of conditions, and gives it negative weight—that is, opposite to
what is implied by the objective of minimizing social harm—in the most con-
sequential settings, if one accepts commonly advanced views (although these
will be called into question). Accordingly, it is difficult to defend this approach
48 As this term in the text emphasizes, the commonly advanced approach, despite sometimes being
discussed as if it involves a general prohibition on communications, is actually intended, even if
implicitly, to be a selective one, as section 3.1 elaborates.
49 See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002)
(opinion by Judge Posner) (“This statutory language [of Sherman Act Section 1] is broad
enough . . . to encompass a purely tacit agreement to fix prices, that is, an agreement made without
any actual communication among the parties to the agreement. . . . Nevertheless, it is generally
believed . . . that an express, manifested agreement, and thus an agreement involving actual, verba-
lized communication, must be proved in order for a price-fixing conspiracy to be actionable under
the Sherman Act.”). This manner of articulating the difference is also often mentioned by econo-
mists. See, e.g., Ku¨hn (2001) (advocating that liability for oligopoly pricing should be based exclu-
sively on the use of particular sorts of communication); Porter (2005, 147–148) (suggesting a
distinction between direct and indirect communication); Werden (2004, 780) (there must be
“some evidence of communications of some kind among the defendants through which an agree-
ment could have been negotiated”); and Whinston (2006, 20) (referring to the law as prohibiting
“talking” between firms); see also Motta (2007, 315). Similar depictions are offered with regard to
law in the European Union. See, e.g., Black (2005, 341) (finding “high[ly] plausible . . . the view that
[concerted practices under EU Article 101, formerly 81] involve communication”) and Jones (1993,
276).
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even as a proxy technique that might be rationalized by the difficulty of detect-
ing successful oligopolistic coordination.
Because the key elements of defining the social harm, detecting its presence,
and determining the appropriate sanction have already been considered, there
is a fundamental sense in which the analysis in part 2 is complete.50 That is,
there is no logical necessity to consider why one or another approach that fails
to emerge from a systematic analysis of the problem might not be superior after
all. This conclusion is all the more compelling with regard to commentators’
favored alternative given the prima facie basis just offered for doubting its
sensibility. Nevertheless, because a communications-based prohibition has
nearly monopolized analysts’ attention—the main exception being Posner’s
writing, the substance of which is largely ignored—it is fitting to undertake a
thorough, side-by-side comparison.
Section 3.1 begins by defining this alternative. Although familiar in a rough
sense, closer examination reveals it to be obscure, so some elaboration is
required in order to render coherent any further assessment. Sections 3.2–3.6
mirror part 2 in considering social welfare, detection, and sanctions. Sections
3.4 and 3.5—on detection through the use of circumstantial evidence, and the
resulting paradox of proof—are particularly notable because they elaborate an
important and underappreciated manner in which the most commonly
advanced method, if consistently pursued, is not merely incomplete and off
target but potentially perverse. Rather than being simpler than the direct in-
quiry presented in section 2.2, the inference process is more complex and, of
greater concern, is in conflict with the social objective of the legal prohibition.
3.1. Definition of the Approach51
Despite being long discussed and widely endorsed, the commonly favored view
of the determinant of liability for oligopolistic coordination is difficult to ar-
ticulate. Most commentators, regulators, and courts offer neither a canonical
statement nor a series of well-constructed illustrations from which one can infer
the scope of the contemplated prohibition. In writing on the U.S. rule, the
modal statement by commentators is that there must be an express or explicit
agreement—although some reject this formulation and indicate that the
breadth is at least somewhat greater, perhaps including tacit agreements,
50 An important exception involves institutional issues, many of which might best be addressed dif-
ferently under different approaches to detection and the definition of the rule for liability. See
Kaplow (2011a, sec. V.A).
51 This section draws heavily on Kaplow (2011c), especially parts I and II; repeated references thereto
are omitted.
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whatever they might be.52 This choice of language as well as the archetypical
example of secret meetings to discuss future prices suggests an emphasis on
particular sorts of interfirm communication.
A close consensus on the criterion for liability may not exist. If there is one,
this author has been unable to discern its content.53 Moreover, it is important
to explore the approach broadly, not dwelling on particulars, since we wish to
know whether strengths and shortcomings are generic rather than possibly
idiosyncratic to one or another formulation. Accordingly, it is helpful to state
the communications-based prohibition in an abstract and general fashion.
Let us say that the set X is comprised of only (but all of ) those communi-
cations (or other acts54) that are deemed to constitute agreements, or conspira-
cies, or concerted actions, and thus to give rise to liability. All other
communications are deemed to fall in the permitted set X0. That is, any acts
(or clusters of acts) that are deemed legally sufficient for liability are elements of
set X, and all others, set X0.55 Communications in set X might be limited by
mode: face-to-face meetings, letters, phone calls, and emails count, whereas
hand or smoke signals—deemed to be in the set X0—do not. Or they might
be limited by content: future prices may be a forbidden subject whereas present
prices would be permissible; assurances might be prohibited whereas declar-
ations of intentions or predictions would be allowed. Or they might be limited
by the setting: statements in smoke-filled rooms could be prosecuted whereas
52 See, e.g., Hay (2006, 891–895) (discussing the lack of clarity in courts’ use of the term tacit agree-
ment) and Kovacic (1993, 14–21) (discussing courts’ varying usage of the term tacit agreement).
Articulating the current state of the law is challenging. As explained in detail in Kaplow (2011c, part
III), some authoritative pronouncements fairly clearly embrace all interdependent behavior in the
prohibition; others just as clearly rule it out; elaborations are intermittent and inconsistent; and key
elements of practice (the use of plus factors, jury instructions on liability, and the rule for determin-
ing damages—and also the absence of many of the litigation behaviors implied by the paradox of
proof) implicitly adopt the broad approach that requires only interdependence, even when em-
ployed by courts that purport to take a narrower view. EU law is less elaborated and similarly murky.
53 Usually none of the key terms are defined, and they are often elaborated in conflicting ways. The
ambiguity is often so high that it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare views.
54 For convenience and because it seems in accordance with what most have in mind, this article will
use the language of communications when referring to the sorts of acts that are in set X. The analysis
that makes reference to this set, however, does not depend on this interpretation. This generalization
is also useful in light of the difficulty even of defining communications for present purposes, on
which see Kaplow (2011c, sec. II.B).
55 Because this approach essentially targets particular acts, those in set X, that have a tendency to
facilitate successful oligopolistic coordination, while not targeting successful price elevation itself,
one might describe the approach as one that renders price fixing, standing alone, per se legal (that is,
legal in and of itself) and deems illegal only certain types of attempts or the use of certain means of
accomplishing it, which amounts to deeming illegal certain facilitating practices. Viewed this way,
there arises the further doctrinal question whether there must exist an agreement (or conspiracy,
concerted action, or whatever) concerning the use of acts in X. See Kaplow (2011c, sec. II.B.2).
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public announcements would be tolerated; permissible methods of price an-
nouncements may be more circumscribed when there are a few large buyers that
occasionally place large orders than when there are significant numbers of
small, non-repeat purchasers. Or these and further dimensions might be
combined.
The central reasons for focusing on some delimited set of communications
rather than on commonly used terms like agreement, conspiracy, and concerted
action are that the latter are vague, their scope is contested, and they are most
plausibly understood as close synonyms for interdependence, as explored at
length in the predecessor to this article (Kaplow 2011c).56 The last observation
means that the prohibition would be of the sort examined in part 2, which most
commentators reject and which would render further comparison unnecessary.
To illustrate the predicament, consider a simple example in which two gasoline
stations on adjacent corners in a remote location successfully coordinate their
behavior to charge a significantly elevated price. If they achieve this objective
through sequential price jousting involving responsive posting of price signs,
most would deem there to be no agreement, but if they accomplish it through a
secret discussion having precisely the same sequence and content, all would
deem there to exist an express agreement. Suppose, indeed, that identical in-
formation is conveyed, identical states of mind are produced (achieving a
so-called “meeting of the minds”), and identical actions result, having identical
consequences. The sharply and unambiguously opposite legal outcomes must
be due to the nature of the interfirm communications, not the substance of the
resulting consensus between the firms.57
Note further that what matters is the character rather than the existence of
communications. After all, in the example just given, communication is equally
present in both cases. Firms generally set prices, issue public statements, and
engage in trade association activity that involves communication, much of
which is not and would not sensibly be prohibited. In any event, the present
formulation of the sets X and X0, with the generality it encompasses, does
capture much of what seems to be envisioned by those who would reach dif-
ferent outcomes in the hypothesized example and, notably, who would describe
56 For example, agreement or conspiracy is commonly defined as involving a meeting of the minds or
common understanding, which concepts clearly cover plain interdependence that coordinates on an
elevated price. As mentioned, many focus on communications as the target of the prohibition, yet
such are involved in myriad settings in which no agreement is said to exist. One might try to
distinguish signals from language, but the existence of rich sign languages (among other points)
renders this demarcation untenable.
57 This point can also be seen by comparing secret price-fixing discussions with seriatim press con-
ference that convey the same messages and achieve the same results, the former being regarded as the
archetypical express agreement and the latter as permissible.
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or advocate that the legal prohibition be significantly more limited than one on
any oligopolistic coordination that succeeds in elevating price.
Before proceeding with the analysis in sections 3.2–3.6, it is worth contem-
plating further the contours of this sort of communications-based prohibition.
It is natural to inquire into the grounds for singling out some types of com-
munication while excluding others. Even though most commentators seem to
favor a rule that does just this, essentially no attention has been devoted to the
question of how one would decide which sorts of communication (or acts more
generally) should be deemed to be in the set X and which in X0.58 The most
plausible approach would involve balancing the benefits against the costs of
including particular acts in the prohibited set. However, the benefits would
presumably be those of better deterring coordinated oligopolistic price eleva-
tion and the costs those of greater chilling of desirable behavior. Hence, con-
sistently pursuing this route replicates the direct approach elaborated in part 2.
This point merely restates what is mentioned at the outset of this part: the
suggestion that, once the analysis in part 2 has been performed, the task is
complete. The result would not be sets X and X0 of the sort commentators
generally envision. Rather, it would be just the direct approach itself.
Suppose that one sticks with a prohibition that is limited to the types of
communication sometimes described as involving express or explicit agreement.
A further difficulty in any communications-based prohibition is posed by the
flexibility and substitutability of modes of communication. If one prohibits
talking, individuals can write. If writing is unavailable, there are hand signals,
even full sign languages. Firms competing in an industry may know each other
well and interact over extended periods of time, allowing for the development of
subtle, yet effective means of communication. They have strong incentives to
find some way to communicate and may do so if any channels are left open.
To help understand this challenge, consider the problem of functional
equivalents. One option is to limit the triggering category X to a prespecified
list of modes, content, or various combinations, meaning that there will inev-
itably exist fairly close functional equivalents, to many elements in X, that do
not give rise to liability. This approach invites circumvention. On the other
58 This gap is remarkable. It may be partially explained by the earlier observation that commentators
have not done much even to define the approach that they claim is embodied in existing law and/or
should be. In attempting to state a sharper definition, the question of why some acts are included in
the prohibition and others excluded from it would become more salient.
There has also been only a modest amount of analysis and little highly probative empirical evidence
(that is, in realistic, relevant settings) on the role of communications in facilitating oligopolistic coordin-
ation, and relatedly on the implicit assumption that communications are more useful than actions (such as
price moves) in sending credible messages (contrary to the familiar maxim that “actions speak louder than
words”). For further discussion, see Kaplow (2011c, secs. II.B.3, IV.B.2).
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hand, if functional equivalents—both existing ones and ones that may be de-
veloped over time—are included in set X, then there is no real limitation. After
all, the function in question is to communicate sufficiently well to enable suc-
cessful interdependent behavior. Thus, when effective interdependence is pre-
sent, the function has been served and liability would be triggered. A functional
approach therefore implies no limit to the inclusion of all successful inter-
dependent oligopolistic behavior, which is contrary to the intention of those
who would impose a communications requirement. Put another way, it is dif-
ficult to conceive of commentators’ communications-based approach to liabil-
ity except as one entailing a substantial degree of formalism in defining the sets
X and X0.
3.2. Social Problem
The key point about the relationship between a selective communications pro-
hibition and social welfare has been stated in the introduction to this part: the
connection between the rule and purpose is indirect, the rule focusing on a
subset of means that are related to adverse effects on social welfare rather
than seeking directly to ascertain whether behavior is socially detrimental.
Questions addressed in section 3.1 concerning the difficulty of articulating
this approach—defining which acts are in X rather than X0—reinforce the
point that the method is significantly detached from the social objective.
Indeed, the more one attempts to define which acts are in prohibited set X
with the objective of the prohibition in mind, such as by employing a
cost-benefit test or by including functional equivalents, the more the approach
tends to dissolve into the direct inquiry pursued in part 2.
More broadly, as mentioned, a large portion of probative evidence would not
seem to be directly relevant under the communications-focused prohibition.
As will be explored in sections 3.4 and 3.5, such evidence is still be considered,
but it is ultimately legally relevant for making inferences about the likelihood
that acts in set X were employed—which is only indirectly relevant to
whether liability would be socially desirable—rather than making inferences
about whether undesirable behavior has occurred. Moreover, this will be so
even when the latter inference is more straightforward and reliable than the
former inference.
Although this mismatch between approach and objective is fairly plain, it is
worth revisiting the social welfare consequences of oligopolistic coordination to
sharpen our understanding of the gap. Successful interdependence generates
losses in static (mainly allocative) efficiency and dynamic efficiency (particu-
larly involving excessive entry)—or, under a common view, losses in consumer
surplus. These adverse effects are caused by price elevation. On their face, they
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seem to be neither more nor less severe when the means by which such elevation
is coordinated happen to involve one or another type of communication or
other facilitating practice.
Subsection 2.1.2 did identify some possible benefits of oligopolistic price
elevation, such as gains due to product variety that is usefully increased by
the prospect of supracompetitive pricing. These benefits, however, depend on
certain industry traits—notably, the nature of consumers’ demands for differ-
ent products—but not directly on whether communications (or other acts) in
some set X need to be or are in fact employed in elevating price.
If one considers the matter further, one can imagine that there might some-
times be a connection. Notably, when product differentiation is particularly
important, coordination is much more difficult, so one might suspect that it
would only be feasible (if it is at all) when frequent, explicit communications
are employed. In this instance, the need for such communications is associated
with the net social benefit of limiting price elevation being below average, so
perhaps a more permissive approach could be justified in such circumstances.
This implication runs directly counter to that of the communications-based
prohibition, which confines liability to situations involving highly explicit com-
munications.59 This particular observation is speculative and possibly of limited
importance, and there may well be other settings in which the need to use acts
in some set X in achieving price elevation is instead positively correlated with
the likelihood or magnitude of social harm. Nevertheless, the relationship seems
in most instances to be attenuated and not of sufficient strength to warrant an
across-the-board, exclusive focus on the use of acts in set X.
Social welfare analysis is also importantly concerned with chilling effects.
Perhaps substituting a selective communications prohibition has advantages
in this regard. One possible influence on chilling costs depends on how high
the burden of proof is set. One might suppose that it would be set quite high. In
that case, there would be few false positives—and significantly diluted deter-
rence as well. Of course, one might set the proof burden high under the direct
approach, similarly reducing false positives. Indeed, the prior discussion in
subsection 2.1.3 explains that it probably makes sense to elevate proof burdens
when key evidence is associated with significant chilling costs.
The more relevant question is whether placing greater (exclusive) reliance on
evidence of the use of practices in X would better distinguish true coordinated
price elevation from actual competition than would the alternative of consider-
ing all the relevant evidence, focusing on how it illuminates this distinction
59 This limitation arises both de jure, by the nature of the prohibition on its face, and de facto, in that
credible evidence of use of such communications is more likely to appear when they are more
frequent and elaborate.
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rather than a qualitatively different one, and giving the greatest weight to the
types that are most reliable in a given context. The question largely answers
itself. This subject should be kept in mind in the analysis that follows, particu-
larly the discussion in sections 3.3 through 3.5 on detection and in section 4.1,
which introduces a more radical approach that eschews any use of circumstan-
tial evidence.
A further point suggesting an a priori basis for skepticism about the com-
munications-based prohibition concerns the relationship between social wel-
fare and the likelihood of finding liability by type of industry. Chilling effects are
most likely, and the benefits of deterrence are least important, in industries that
appear to be fairly competitive. However, because these industries tend to be
less conducive to collusion, they are the ones—under the (possibly mistaken)
views of many, as discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5—in which the use of acts in
X and thus a finding of liability are relatively more likely under the commu-
nications-based prohibition than under the direct approach. Therefore, upon
further analysis, a communications-based prohibition seems to be even more
poorly matched with the social objective than might first appear.
The comparison of approaches is also helpfully viewed from another, com-
plementary perspective—one focused on the use of evidence and the setting of
the burden of proof. As a general proposition, it would seem that a concern for
chilling effects is best addressed through a combination of utilizing as much
probative evidence as possible in a manner that reflects complementarities and
risks of error and of setting an appropriately high proof requirement. Precisely
these considerations dominate the analysis in part 2, particularly section 2.2.
The communications-based approach reflects a qualitatively different strategy:
instead of elevating the burden of proof directly, it changes what it is that must
be proved. In doing so, the relevance and weight of evidence is determined by
considerations that have a looser relationship to the social objective, and argu-
ably a strong negative connection in important instances. This fundamental
strategic difference explains why commentators’ preferred method is likely to
constitute an inferior, perhaps significantly inferior, alternative.
3.3. Detection: Internal and Other Direct Evidence of Prohibited Communications
Detection of prohibited communications—determining whether firms used
any acts in X or confined themselves solely to acts in X0—is difficult for the
usual reason that firms try to hide actions that are deemed to be illegal and
subject to significant sanctions. In this respect, the challenge is similar to that in
section 2.2, addressed to the detection of successful oligopolistic coordination.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that what we are seeking to detect here
is qualitatively different from what it was in the prior discussion. Even when
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considering the same sort of evidence, we are not using it to answer the same
question.
To begin, consider the relevance under a communications-based prohibition
of whether successful oligopolistic coordination has taken place. Under one
approach, liability would arise only when acts in X were employed and they
succeeded in achieving price elevation. In that case, one would have to under-
take the analysis in section 2.2 as well as that necessary to detect the use of
prohibited communications. Under another approach, demonstration of the
use of acts in X would be sufficient to establish liability. This regime would
differ in that it would in essence punish attempts (of a certain type) independ-
ent of success.60 Making the use of prohibited communications sufficient for
liability may also be justified on the ground that direct proof of successful
coordination is difficult while success may be inferred from the attempt, pre-
suming that firms would not undertake the effort and risk liability unless they
thought success was likely.
Most commentary does not mention this distinction, much less explore
which approach is thought to be embodied in existing law (if either is) or
constitutes better policy. In any event, as discussed in section 2.3, a sensible
sanctioning regime tends to base penalties in significant part on the extent of
success, in which case the magnitude of coordinated oligopolistic price eleva-
tion, if any, will be relevant even under the view that attempts are enough to
establish liability. Moreover, as will become apparent, inferring from circum-
stantial evidence whether acts in X were used involves a preliminary determin-
ation of the existence of successful coordination. For these reasons, the analysis
in this part will ordinarily assume that proof of success is required, one way or
another, although the discussion will bear on failed attempts and on those
whose success cannot be ascertained. Even so, the focus of this section and
those that follow will be on how evidence affects the inference that acts in X
were employed—rather than solely acts in X0—for the problem of detection of
success was examined in section 2.2.
This section begins the analysis of detection of prohibited communications
by considering internal and other direct evidence of proscribed communica-
tions. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 analyze market-based evidence of prohibited com-
munications. This latter inquiry is extensive because the process of inference
can be complicated in ways that are not well appreciated, and the implications
for a communications-based prohibition are far-reaching.
If secret meetings among competitors in hotel rooms to discuss future pri-
cing are prohibited, direct evidence might consist of a recording of a meeting,
60 On the punishment of attempts in the price-fixing context, see Kaplow (2011a, sec. V.B).
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a witness to its occurrence, or an internal document referring to the event. Such
proof is often referred to as “smoking-gun” evidence, and, when it is available,
unambiguous, and reliable, the inquiry may well be complete. Due to firms’
interests in maintaining secrecy, however, this type of proof often will not be
available. Additionally, internal evidence may be ambiguous and some, notably
testimony of informants who may be disgruntled employees, may be unreliable.
Also, such evidence may implicate particular individuals, but to establish the
firm’s culpability it may also be necessary to consider the individuals’ authority
in the firm, who else knew about their activities, and whether the firm likely
acted in light of the communications.
As suggested by the prior discussion in subsection 2.2.2, internal evidence
should also be considered much more broadly—and it ordinarily is in cases that
lack smoking-gun evidence. Thus, all manner of internal evidence—planning
documents, emails, data-gathering activities—may provide a basis for inferring
whether acts in X were employed. In addition to direct, detailed references,
there may also be indirect indicators, such as internal exchanges that may not
have been possible in the absence of the prohibited interfirm communications.
For example, there may be expression of knowledge about other firms’ future
behavior, or discussions of strategies that would not make sense without such
specific understandings. As mentioned previously, firms may attempt to avoid
creating internal evidence or to distort its appearance, but it is unclear the
extent to which such efforts can succeed.
With much internal evidence, the inference process is far more treacherous
than is usually recognized. The reason is that the communications-based pro-
hibition is premised on the view that interdependence may be possible without
having to rely on acts in X and that such is legal. Keep in mind that the set X0 is
large, and it specifically includes many means by which firms might commu-
nicate with each other. To illustrate the difficulty, suppose that internal docu-
ments make explicit, repeated references to the firms having an agreement or
engaging in concerted action. While these may be taken as admissions of liabil-
ity, such would be a mistake under the proffered, restrictive view of the law. As
noted, these terms are readily defined as interdependence and do not in ordin-
ary usage convey information about the means by which such agreement or
concert was achieved. Sometimes they do: a seller of a house saying that the
property is under an agreement clearly conveys a conventional understanding
of an explicit, typically legally binding, contract. But outside such contexts, a
broader set of implications is possible. Accordingly, even direct statements of
the existence of an agreement may in themselves do little to indicate whether
such agreement was reached using at least one act in X or only acts in X0.
More often, one might see internal evidence of the existence of an under-
standing in an industry, that a firm does not want to behave aggressively
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because such action would upset rivals, and so forth. Such evidence is likewise
silent on how any such understanding came about.61 Therefore, much internal
evidence may be highly probative of the existence of oligopolistic coordination
(the question in section 2.2), but not, standing alone, very probative of whether
communications in the prohibited set X were employed. Note importantly that,
in such cases, proof of successful interdependence would be easier and more
reliable than proof of the use of prohibited communications.62
To overcome this obstacle, it is necessary to make the further inference that
the agreement or understanding that is demonstrated through internal evidence
could not, under the circumstances, have come about unless the firms engaged
in prohibited communications. In this respect, once one moves past crisp,
smoking-gun internal evidence (e.g., a document referring to the meeting at
the Sands Hotel on April 7, 2010 at which a firm’s vice president discussed and
agreed with counterparties Smith from Rival 1 and Jones from Rival 2 to raise
prices on May 1, 2010, from 100 to 120), one begins to enter the territory where
one is also employing other evidence in attempting to make the requisite in-
ference. This supplemental evidence may also be internal in nature. Often,
however, internal evidence (plus any direct proof of prohibited interfirm com-
munications themselves) will not by itself be sufficiently powerful. In such
cases, one must rely in varying degrees on market-based evidence.63
3.4. Detection: Market-Based Evidence of Prohibited Communications
3.4.1. Circumstantial Evidence
It is a basic maxim of competition law and of conspiracy law more generally
that circumstantial evidence may be employed.64 Moreover, it is widely
61 This point does not seem to be well appreciated. See Kaplow (2011c, 747–748 n.158).
62 It is as if the social objective is concerned with the presence of hay, but the rule forces us to wade
through a substantial haystack in order to ascertain whether or not some needles might be hidden
inside.
63 Note additionally that even the purely internal and other direct evidence—when not in itself con-
clusive—suffers from the problems raised by the paradox of proof that are explored in the sections to
follow: if one accepts that the relationship is like that depicted, say, in Figures 1–3, the result is to
exonerate defendants in cases posing the greatest social danger and the least risk of chilling effects, as
discussed in section 3.5.
64 On U.S. antitrust law, see, for example, ABA (2007, 5–6 & n.29) (“Conspiracies can be proven either
by direct or circumstantial evidence. . . . [C]ourts traditionally recognized that ‘[o]nly rarely will
there be direct evidence of an express agreement’ in conspiracy cases . . . . Circumstantial evidence as
to this element of the offense is . . . not only admissible, but often dispositive.” (quoting Local Union
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 720 (1965), and for the latter
proposition, citing, inter alia, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984))),
Areeda and Hovenkamp (2003, 2), and Blair (2008, 3) (who, in introducing a symposium on Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), mentions that “plaintiffs may, of course, rely upon
circumstantial evidence”). On conspiracy law more generally, see, for example, LaFave (2003, 267)
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accepted that, once acts are made illegal and subject to heavy sanctions, they will
be driven underground and accompanied by concealment, so circumstantial
evidence may need to be employed if adequate deterrence is to be achieved. This
proposition is especially applicable in the present setting since the prohibition
under discussion is limited to particular communications or other identified
acts, those deemed to be in the set X. The relevant contrast is with a prohibition
aimed at successful oligopolistic coordination, where the act in question, coor-
dinated price elevation, is more public—even though, as section 2.2 indicates, it
is nevertheless often difficult to detect.
Making inferences about the use of prohibited communications from cir-
cumstantial, market-based evidence is likely to be difficult. Some acts in X may
be virtually indistinguishable from some acts in X0 when viewed directly, clearly,
and closely, particularly with regard to those near the boundary. How, then, are
they to be distinguished when viewed indirectly, obscurely, and from afar? One
must search for symptoms, but such will often be noisy signals. Even highly
explicit and uninhibited communications can fail: some firms may not agree,
and, even when they all think that they have agreed, cheating may nevertheless
break out quickly. And communications limited to ordinary pricing behavior in
the marketplace might succeed. It is usually believed that explicit, frequent, and
direct communications make success more likely. The hypothesized relationship
is probabilistic. On average, the difference in the likelihood of success when
using certain elements of X rather than certain others of X0 (those near the
boundaries) will be small. Oligopolistic coordination may be quite unlikely,
but nevertheless more likely when using acts in X. Or it might be highly
likely, but even more so when using acts in X. Furthermore, as stated, these
relationships are only true on average; in any given case, there might be no
discernable effect (and sometimes the effect may even be the reverse). Hence,
the routine inference problem is daunting.
Do note, however, that this problem will not be present in all cases. For
example, liability may be found if observed behavior could only have arisen
through the use of prohibited means in X that have no resemblance to any of
those in X0. Unfortunately, such clarity may rarely be possible.65 More broadly,
(“It is thus well established that the prosecution may ‘rely on inferences drawn from the course of
conduct of the alleged conspirators.’” (quoting Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221
(1939), an antitrust case, on this general principle of the criminal law of conspiracy)).
65 Some commentators have identified circumstances applicable in special cases in which inferences
about communication might be more straightforward. Perhaps most often mentioned is the sub-
mission of identical, non-round-number, secret bids for made-to-order items. See, e.g., Areeda &
Hovenkamp (2003, 168, 243). All of the qualifications are necessary for the claimed inference, which
shows how infrequently it would be available. Even such limited exceptions have further, unrecog-
nized qualifications. Notably, it must also be true that public price announcements are deemed
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in order to make the necessary inferences, one will have to view all the facts and
circumstances bearing on conduciveness to successful coordination, supple-
ment these findings with knowledge of which means of coordination are asso-
ciated with what probabilities of success in the identified type of setting, and
also consider the degree of success that has occurred. How all of this may be
done is considered next.
3.4.2. Paradox of Proof: Overview
The ideas underlying inferences about the use of prohibited communications
from market-based evidence are as follows. First, one considers whether suc-
cessful oligopolistic coordination is likely to be taking place. If it is very unlikely,
then an inference that it is being attempted through improper means—that acts
in X are being employed—is unwarranted, which is to say that the probability is
illegal (which most offering this sort of illustration do not believe to be the case). To see why,
suppose that the use of prohibited communications might otherwise be inferred from the posited
identity of secret bids at a price of, say, 3.518 per unit. To break the inference of secret advance
communications, all that is required is for one clever firm to announce publicly that it intends to bid
(or is thinking of bidding) 3.518, at which point a follow-the-price-leader explanation is a compet-
ing inference. Of course, the firms may well have met secretly to agree on the 3.518 price; but as long
as, after the meeting, some firm makes the public announcement—and this too can be planned at
the meeting—the ability to infer from the pricing coincidence that such a meeting must have
occurred would be disrupted. (The fact that we never seem to observe this circumvention strategy
is suggestive of what firms and their lawyers implicitly believe the law to be. See Kaplow (2011c, sec.
III.E).)
This example also has another serious deficiency: if the firms are secretly meeting to set prices, why
should they all submit identical bids that will appear suspicious? See Posner (2001, 87). Instead, they
could—and, it appears, do—choose a low bidder in advance and arrange for others to submit
plausible-looking-but-higher bids. See, e.g., Porter (2005, 156) (who, in reviewing a study of auctions
for oil and gas leases, suggests that bids may have been submitted in such a fashion as “to create the
appearance of competition”); Porter & Zona (1993) (finding that non-winning cartel members submitted
phony higher bids in highway construction auctions); and Department of Justice (2010, 2)
(“Complementary bidding schemes are the most frequently occurring forms of bid rigging, and they
defraud purchasers by creating the appearance of competition to conceal secretly inflated prices.”).
Winners might be chosen randomly by the colluding firms. However, more often, particular rotations
would be more efficient and thus profitable for the conspirators. For example, it would be better to allocate
particular bids to firms that have more excess capacity at the moment or are more favorably located. And
there is evidence that bidders that meet secretly to plan bids do rotate in this fashion rather than submit
identical bids and leave it to the buyer to choose the winner. See Comanor & Schankerman (1976) (arguing
that bid rotation is more likely, especially when there are smaller numbers of firms, and reporting that, in
prosecuted bidding cartels, the substantial majority of cases involving eight or fewer firms employed bid
rotation) and Cook (1963, 68) (“In fact, if I were asked, I would certainly bet that most conspiracies
involving public tenders are conspiracies to rotate the low bid—and the business. That is, the bidding firms
have agreed among themselves who should get the business, and they purposely let that company be low.”);
see also Davis & Wilson (2002, 64–72) (examining the effects of allowing communications on pricing in
experimental sealed-bid auctions both when firms’ costs are fixed and when they depend on output
committed as a result of winning previous auctions). Indeed, it has been argued that the high prevalence
of identical secret bids in government contracting is evidence of less explicit cartel arrangements. See
McAfee & McMillan (1992, 584).
490 ~ Kaplow: Direct versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing
 at Ernst M












low.66 Since cases that involve no apparent coordination are ubiquitous—all the
more so if deterrence is reasonably successful—the probability is presumably
too low to justify a positive inference.
Now suppose that successful oligopolistic coordination is established with
some requisite likelihood. Under the more direct analysis considered in section
2.2, the inquiry would be complete. However, under a communications-based
prohibition, we must ask a second question: whether, under the circumstances
of the market in question, such success is sufficiently unlikely in the absence of
the use of prohibited communications (acts in X) to warrant an inference that
such acts were used. This inference process is obviously more involved than that
required under a prohibition on successful oligopolistic coordination since an
additional inquiry is necessary. Moreover, as will be seen, this second question
is more difficult to answer than is the first.
Before proceeding, the reader should be warned that implications of the
inference process under examination are peculiar in that they differ in substan-
tial, unexpected ways from prior understanding and sometimes seem greatly at
odds with how parties and adjudicators view the law. The discussion here does
not, however, purport to describe the law in action, but rather to draw out
previously unexamined logical implications of conventional views. Conflicts
that emerge bear on whether a communications-based prohibition makes
sense and also on whether common understandings of what the law currently
requires are sound.
Let us begin by stating the basic logic that gives rise to the paradox of proof
(see, e.g., Fraas & Greer 1977, 29–30; Baker 1993, 185–194). In any case under
consideration, there will exist various evidence about the extent of oligopolistic
coordination that is occurring or has occurred. This factor and some others will
be taken as given for the moment but explored further in subsections 3.4.3 and
3.4.5. The present focus is on the degree to which the market at hand is con-
ducive to successful coordinated oligopoly pricing.67
Start at the extreme end of the spectrum at which circumstances render
successful coordination impossible regardless of the means employed. In that
case, there is a strong inference that prohibited communications were not used.
66 It is not zero because the evidence on successful coordination may be mistaken (false negatives) and
because attempts may fail.
67 For most of this section, the emphasis is on factors that influence the ease of coordination, but not all
factors that are favorable to oligopolistic price elevation have this feature. For example, if the
product in question is one for which there is greater market power—that is, the profit-maximizing
monopoly price is higher—it may not be any easier for oligopolists to succeed in maintaining a
supracompetitive price, although their motivation to do so would be greater. Hence, as market
power rises, throughout the range it might be more rather than less likely that they would employ
acts in X that facilitate coordination.
Winter 2011: Volume 3, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 491
 at Ernst M












While parties might misperceive the situation and the evidence of infeasibility
might be mistaken, suppose that neither possibility is very likely.68
Next, consider moving from this pole to examine cases in which successful
coordination, although still not easy, is increasingly plausible. Along the way,
the likelihood that prohibited communications, that is, acts in category X, were
employed rises. Firms would not risk such action, the direct detection of which
would give rise to liability (including possible criminal sanctions), unless there
was at least some likelihood of success. In this range, that likelihood is taken to
be increasing, so the plausibility of the use of the necessary actions to achieve
success is similarly increasing.
In contrast, consider the opposite end of the spectrum, settings in which
successful coordination is so easy that firms can accomplish it almost automat-
ically. In that case, it is thought to be unlikely that acts in X were employed.
Why would firms use such means, with a risk of detection and possibly severe
sanctions, when by assumption they can accomplish the same results confining
their activities to those in X0?69
If one considers cases just short of this pole, the likelihood of the use of
prohibited communications would plausibly be higher. Coordinated oligopoly
pricing is taken to be sufficiently easy that there is a substantial chance of
success, but as this chance becomes smaller, the effectiveness of coordination
may well be enhanced by employing a broader set of tools, making it ever more
likely that the firms resorted to some acts in X.
Combining the foregoing cases, it seems that the likelihood of the use of
prohibited communications (or other prohibited behavior), defined as the use
of acts in set X, at first rises and then ultimately falls as the degree to which the
market is conducive to coordination increases. This characterization is repre-
sented in Figure 1. As one moves from the left to the right along the horizontal
axis, the ease of coordination is taken to be increasing, starting with no possi-
bility of coordination (denoted by 0) and ending at extremely easy coordination
(denoted by 1). The vertical axis indicates the likelihood (probability, ranging
from 0 to 1) of the use of prohibited communications, that is, of at least some
act in X. As mentioned, it is supposed that initially, as the ease of coordination
68 Recall that the discussion takes as given evidence bearing on what pricing is actually present in the
market. If there were, for example, strong evidence of consistent coordinated oligopoly pricing, then
the likelihood of a mistake might actually be high. The alternative assumption is that strong evidence
that such pricing is nearly impossible in the industry would cast doubt on the evidence that it is
occurring. For the present, suppose we are not considering a case in which the evidence of successful
oligopoly pricing is extremely strong. The interaction between these two dimensions is discussed in
subsection 3.4.3.
69 Reservations are developed in subsection 3.4.5.
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rises, starting from zero, the likelihood that some act in set X was employed
rises, but, as the ease becomes sufficiently high, this likelihood falls. (The
smooth, simple, and roughly symmetric character of the curve, as well as its
height at various points, should be understood as an abstraction for illustrative
purposes, on which more below.)
It is still necessary to translate this inference—from the ease of coordination
to the likelihood of the use of acts in X—into a finding on liability. For con-
creteness, consider the proof standard of more likely than not,70 in which case
one simply needs to consider the portion of the curve that lies above 0.5 (50%),
as depicted in Figure 2. (Such a liability threshold may well not be optimal, even
conditional on the prohibition being defined in this manner, a doubt suggested
by the analysis in section 2.1.3 on the optimal tradeoff of deterrence and chilling
costs (see Kaplow 2012a, b).)
In this figure, we can see the immediate implications for liability. When the
ease of coordination is low, there is no liability because the inferred likelihood
of the use of prohibited communications is too low. When the ease of coord-
ination becomes sufficiently high, in the middle region, there is liability. As the
ease becomes higher still, the likelihood of the use of acts in X begins to fall and
eventually becomes low enough that once again the likelihood is insufficient for
liability.















70 For other proof standards, it is obvious how the following diagrams would be modified. See infra
section 3.5. Relatedly, it will be discussed in subsection 3.4.3 that the curve in Figure 1 might in fact
be higher or lower; the level depicted in this figure is essentially arbitrary. However, the qualitative
statements presented throughout would be largely the same.
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As a shorthand, consider the depiction in Figure 3. Here, attention is con-
fined to the horizontal axis. The middle (liability) region is where the use of acts
in X is inferred with the specified probability (taken here to be greater than 0.5).
The intuition is that the ease of coordination is sufficiently high that attempts to
collude are likely yet the degree is sufficiently low that collusion probably
cannot succeed without using at least some act in X. The right (no liability)
region is designated as the paradox region. There, the ease of coordination is so
great that coordination is imagined to be readily accomplished without having
to resort to any means in X.
The existence of this third, rightmost region may be regarded as paradoxical
in a number of respects. Perhaps most obvious and important, this formulation
makes clear that the legal requirement as conventionally understood carries the
implication that there is liability in settings of moderate danger but exoneration
in cases where the expected harm from anticompetitive behavior is at its great-
est, a point that will be elaborated in section 3.5. Additional paradoxical features
are developed in the next subsection.
3.4.3. Paradox of Proof: Implications for Adjudication
Using Figure 2 or Figure 3, it is easy to see the a priori ambiguity of presenting
evidence that a given market poses a greater ease of coordination—for example,
evidence of higher concentration, more nearly homogenous products, more
readily observed prices, and larger numbers of smaller buyers placing more
frequent orders. Further evidence that a market is more conducive to coord-
ination than one might have believed in the absence of such evidence will be
















no liabilityno liability liability
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helpful to an enforcer (government agency or private plaintiff) toward the left
of the horizontal axis. As the extent of such evidence mounts, however, the case
eventually approaches the border with the right region, where the inference will
revert to one of no use of acts in X and thus no liability, leading to a victory for
the defendants. Therefore, whether evidence indicating a somewhat greater ease
of coordination favors the enforcer or the defendants will depend on whether
the other facts of the case suggest that it is nearer the left boundary or the right
boundary of the middle, liability region.
This point has interesting implications for parties’ litigation strategies.
Starting with the enforcer at the point of composing a complaint, should it
allege that conditions are highly conducive to coordination or the opposite?
Regarding the ultimate outcome, convincing a decision-maker that conditions
are somewhat more dangerous than what it otherwise would have concluded
may be helpful (toward the left of the horizontal axis) or detrimental (toward
the right). At the outset, it may not be obvious which situation will prevail, that
is, which of the two boundary lines will, after elaborate proceedings, be seen by
an adjudicator to be nearer to the case at hand. Additionally, this uncertainty
may arise not only regarding projections about where on the spectrum the case
falls but also regarding where the decision-maker will believe that the two
boundaries are located (on which more in a moment). In any event, we
should expect that a number of enforcers (especially in cases where the harm
from oligopoly pricing and thus fines or damages would be the largest) would
find it in their interest to allege that conditions are less conducive to coordin-
ation than meets the eye. Defendants’ strategic interests are the reverse.
Of course, each side must not go too far. Enforcers win if the conclusion is
that the ease of coordination is moderate, defendants if it is either high or low.
In this state of affairs, we also should sometimes find parties arguing on the
same side of the issue, for example, when the enforcer is concerned that the
decision-maker may find coordination to be fairly difficult but the defendants
think that coordination will be found to be fairly easy—or when the parties
have different conjectures about where the decision-maker will place the two
Figure 3. Ease of Coordination and Paradox of Proof.
Inferred Use of Acts in X Paradox Region
Ease of Coordination
0 1
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boundaries. We might also see a party switching its side on these issues mid-
stream, if it senses that the decision-maker is likely to land nearer to a boundary
different from the one originally predicted. Overall, it is unusual that one party
needs to show a moderate state of affairs and the other gains by demonstrating
either extreme. (The defendants’ argument in the alternative is of the form:
“Coordination is quite difficult in our market; however, if it isn’t quite difficult,
it’s actually very easy. In any event, it surely isn’t anywhere in between.”)
The matter also seems to make it difficult ever to grant a motion to dismiss,
or for summary judgment, for a court would have to decide that the allegations,
or also the undisputed facts, eliminate any serious question about the region in
which the case falls. The problem is that, except in extreme cases, virtually any
allegation or fact on these dimensions could cut in either direction on liability,
depending on how other facts are weighed, something the court is not supposed
to do at these preliminary stages.
Consider also the implications of the paradox of proof for the use of experts
to demonstrate liability. A (perhaps the) central concern with the more direct
approach developed in section 2.2 that focuses on detecting successful oligop-
olistic coordination is that it involves too complex an inquiry requiring exten-
sive and subtle expert economic evidence that is subject to manipulation,
particularly by financially motivated private parties. The approach to liability
that depends on detection of prohibited communications through circumstan-
tial evidence requires, as mentioned, answering this same question about the
degree of successful coordination and also the one focused on here. Regarding
the latter, the just-described inference process, as it would play out in adjudi-
cation, seems to raise even greater concerns.
The problem is actually worse than may first appear because of the need to
determine the height71 and shape72 of the curve in Figures 1 and 2, which in
turn determine the boundaries between no liability and liability in Figures 2 and
3. As a general matter, empirical evidence bearing on this relationship—which
is contingent on both the strength of evidence that successful coordination is
taking place and on the legal regime, that is, the definition of the set X—seems
nonexistent and difficult to develop. Moreover, the nature of the relationship
will depend on facts of the particular case (notably, particular features of
71 For example, if the curve in Figures 1 and 2 was substantially higher, the liability region would
correspond to much of the horizontal axis. (In principle, it could reach either or both ends. Keep in
mind that the curve is drawn taking as given evidence on the demonstrated likelihood and degree of
success in oligopolistic coordination, which might be quite high.) Alternatively, the curve could be
much lower, in which case the liability region would be thinner or even nonexistent. (Suppose that
other evidence showed that the industry was probably exhibiting competitive pricing.)
72 Variations are presented in the two subsections that follow.
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markets will affect the probability of success that may be achieved using par-
ticular combinations of acts and thus the likelihood that at least some act in X
was employed). Accordingly, witnesses, expert or otherwise, will have to rely
substantially on conjecture when supporting the requisite conclusions.
In comparing the direct approach examined in section 2.2 with the commu-
nications-based prohibition, we can ask which question economists—whether
employed by an enforcement agency or supplying reports to and testifying
before an adjudicator—can know more about: whether successful oligopolistic
coordination is taking place or whether any observed pricing could only have
come about using at least some act in a legally specified set X or may instead
have come about using solely means in X0. However difficult is the first question
in various settings, it is a subject of decades of theoretical and empirical re-
search, whereas little is known about the second question, and even less with
regard to any particular legal definition73 of the sets X and X0.74
Further confounding the inference process are a number of simplifying as-
sumptions employed in subsection 3.4.2 that need to be relaxed to apply the
framework in practice. One already alluded to is that a given set of diagrams is
based on a particular finding relating to the degree of achieved success in oli-
gopolistic coordination. Different degrees imply different curves and thus dif-
ferent regions for liability and no liability. And the degree of success will, of
course, be contested. Thus, in principle, an adjudicator needs to know the
proper curves for each possible finding that may be reached. Furthermore,
evidence bearing on the ease of coordination may also bear on the extent to
which success has been achieved, and vice versa. Indeed, each conclusion is
related to the other: if success seems highly likely and substantial, it is implaus-
ible that the ease of coordination is very low; if the ease of coordination is low,
then one would be more skeptical of evidence demonstrating success; and so
forth. Viewed broadly, one can consider a mapping from all the evidence to a
finding of liability, abstracting from separate, intermediate conclusions—a
viewpoint applicable to the present inquiry into the likelihood of use of pro-
hibited communications, acts in X. This perspective is reinforced by consider-
ing that there also may be some internal or other direct evidence of the use of
prohibited communications that needs to be incorporated in reaching an ul-
timate decision on liability.
73 That is, any expert opinion on the likelihood of use of some acts in X given some set of facts will
depend on precisely which acts or combinations of acts are deemed to be in set X versus in X0, a
matter that itself will be disputed.
74 To this we can add the query emphasized in section 3.2, above, and in section 3.5 to follow, concerning
which question is most probative of whether the application of sanctions would enhance or reduce
social welfare. On both counts—feasibility and normative relevance—the choice does not seem close.
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3.4.4. Breadth of Paradox Region
The preceding subsections consider for illustrative purposes a single, simple,
symmetric relationship between the ease of coordination and the likeli-
hood of use of prohibited communications. But the relationship could
take other forms as well. Suppose that the relationship between the ease of
coordination and the likelihood of use of acts in X is instead as depicted in
Figure 4. Just as in Figures 1 and 2, the likelihood of use of acts in X first rises
and then falls as the ease of coordination increases. The differences are that it
takes a greater ease of coordination for the likelihood of the use of acts in X to
exceed 50% and that this likelihood remains over 50% until the ease of coord-
ination is quite high. The “nl” in the figure is an abbreviation for “no liability,”
the shortened label reflecting that indeed the paradox region is quite narrow in
this case, as shown in Figure 5.
This case is particularly interesting because, despite the existence of the para-
dox of proof, it looks almost like the more intuitive story (suggested by the
analysis in subsection 2.2.1.2) in which there is no liability when the ease of
coordination is low and liability when conduciveness is high. Except in or near a
narrow, extreme region, in which conduciveness is very high, evidence of a
greater ease of coordination favors (or at least does not seriously hurt) the
enforcer and contrary evidence helps the defendants. If these figures depict
the actual state of affairs (again, for a given legal standard, summarized by X
and X0, and given evidence on the extent of oligopolistic price coordination),
there would be little difference in practice from a legal rule that deemed inter-
dependent oligopolistic coordination sufficient for liability in those settings in
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which the ease of coordination was sufficiently high, specifically, beyond the left
boundary in Figures 4 and 5.75
Of course, there remains a difference between the postulated rule, under
which oligopolistic coordination is sufficient for liability when the ease of co-
ordination exceeds a threshold, and the rule embodied in X and X0 that impli-
citly lies behind Figures 4 and 5: in those cases in which the danger is especially
high (the worst cases), the latter rule would exonerate the defendants rather than
finding them liable. A policy-based defense of the X/X0 approach would have to
be grounded in the desirability of allowing coordinated oligopoly pricing in such
cases, a point that will be considered more broadly in the section 3.5. It would
also have to justify expending the resources necessary to distinguish them from
somewhat less extreme cases—keeping in mind that the availability of the de-
fense, even if it is not often true, may motivate defendants to advance it often,
both raising costs and producing some erroneous exonerations in the process.
It remains to ask whether the present depiction is plausible. Many analysts
speak as though this case governs. In offering this characterization, writers do
not speak directly in these terms, for the paradox of proof is only occasionally
recognized and it is not analyzed in the manner done here. Instead, what one
finds are strong statements regarding the difficulty of any real success at oli-
gopolistic coordination in the absence of fairly explicit means of communica-
tion, that is, acts in the set X, even if that set is defined rather narrowly; a
number of commentators deem instances of successful plain interdependence
to be “rare.”76 Given such beliefs, it follows that something like Figures 4 and 5
Figure 5. Narrow Paradox Region and Paradox of Proof.
Inferred Use of Acts in X PR
Ease of Coordination
0 1
75 This depiction rests on the further assumption that most cases do not fall at the extreme right of the
horizontal axis, which supposition is supported by the claims described below in the text.
76 See, e.g., Areeda & Hovenkamp (2003, 215) (“The results of perfect express collusion will rarely be
achieved by mere interdependence without an express agreement standardizing some product or
price terms or relationships.”); Hay (1981, 445) (suggesting that the dilemma regarding whether to
attack all interdependent behavior or just express agreement may not be that practically important
because pure oligopolistic interdependence is likely to be rare); Motta (2004, 141) (offering reasons
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describes the regions of liability and the paradox. Although most who advance
this view offer no empirical evidence in support,77 the industry characteristics
of cases subject to price-fixing prosecutions are consistent with this suppos-
ition: many involve small numbers of firms and homogeneous products, that is,
settings in which the ease of coordination is high—and nevertheless secret
interfirm communications were employed (see, e.g., Hay & Kelley 1974,
26–27; Motta 2007, 318).
It seems surprising that so many commentators implicitly assert conditions
implying a narrow paradox region since most also insist that the law does not
and should not make successful interdependent oligopolistic coordination a
basis for liability.78 First, as noted, there is little difference in practice between
that it would be difficult for firms to coordinate successfully without talking to each other); Motta
(2007, 317) (“it is far from clear that tacit collusion can be sustained over time without competitors
talking to each other”); Neven (2001, 57) (“We review what the economic literature, and in par-
ticular the literature in experimental economics, has to say on the matter. We find few reasons to
think that collusion is ‘easy’ to undertake without extensive ‘concertation’ between firms.”); Nye
(1975, 209) (statement of then-Commissioner of the FTC) (“To put it more forcefully, I believe that
pure ‘interdependence’ without some form of express collusion, however collateral, is a rare case,
perhaps almost academic.”); Posner (1969, 1574) (“[I]t seems improbable that prices could long be
maintained above cost in a market, even a highly oligopolistic one, without some explicit acts of
communication and implementation. One can, to be sure, specify an extreme case in which such acts
might be unnecessary. No more than three sellers selling a completely standardized product to a
multitude of buyers (none large) should be able to maintain the joint maximizing price without
explicit collusion. However, not many industries resemble this model.”); id. at 1575; Posner (1976,
904) (referring to the fact that “one can imagine a group of sellers able to collude without any overt
contact or communication” but asserting that “[s]uch a case is probably rare”); Posner (2001,
66–69); Turner (1962, 665) (“some finite minimum of explicit communication, at some time, is
involved” (quoting Kaysen (1951, 268–269))); id. at 672–673; Werden (2004, 762–763) (“it is far less
clear that unspoken agreements are a significant phenomenon”; for a “considerable time . . . a widely
held view . . . is that ‘coordination cannot be simply spontaneous’” (quoting Elzinga (1984, 25)));
and Whinston (2006, 26) (“most economists are not bothered . . . perhaps because they believe (as I
do) that direct communication (and especially face-to-face communication) often will matter for
achieving cooperation”).
77 Neven (2001, 66) supports his claim by referring to experimental evidence on cooperation in games.
There is, however, reason to be skeptical about the relevance of such evidence in the real-world
contexts of present concern. See, e.g., Whinston (2006, 24) (questioning “whether the results of these
experiments, usually with college students as subjects, are indicative of the actual market behavior of
businessmen and women”).
78 Posner (2001, 97–98), whose academic writing favors reaching successful interdependent oligopoly
pricing, has a different take.
Anyway there probably are few cases of purely tacit collusion. What is being proposed is
less the alteration of the substantive contours of the law than a change in evidentiary
requirements to permit illegal price fixing to be found in circumstances in which an
actual meeting of the minds on a noncompetitive price can be inferred even though
explicit collusion cannot be proved. In most of these cases there will be explicit although
well-concealed collusion that can certainly be deterred by threat of punishment.
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such a rule and one that carefully delineates a set X if one should virtually always
infer the use of acts in X when successful coordination is demonstrated. Why is
there so much insistence on one rule over another when they differ so infre-
quently? And why might it be thought that the more restrictive rule would filter
out a substantial number of cases, especially at the pleading or summary judg-
ment stages, as is often supposed? After all, if there is basis for supporting
oligopolistic interdependence, then sufficiently great ease of coordination is
powerful evidence favoring liability (even when defined as more limited than
interdependence); only in exceptional cases would the ease of coordination be
so great that liability would be negated. Finally, as noted just above, the little
actual difference seems to favor the interdependence rule, for the divergence
involves only the cases posing the most extreme danger.
Now suppose instead that the relationship between the ease of coordination
and the likelihood of prohibited communications takes the form depicted in
Figure 6. Once again, just as in Figures 1 and 2, the likelihood of the use of acts
in X first rises and then falls as the ease of coordination increases. The difference
now is that it takes little danger of coordination for the likelihood of prohibited
communications to exceed 50% and this likelihood remains over 50% only
until the ease of coordination is moderate. In this instance, the narrow “nl ”
region in the figure is at the left extreme. This scenario can be restated as in
Figure 7.
This scenario contrasts sharply with that just discussed. Here, the paradox
region is quite broad, so we would expect enforcers’ and defendants’ strategic
situations often to be reversed, notably, in all cases in which the ease of
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coordination was moderate to significant. Rare would be disputes where it was
important for an enforcer to establish that the ease of coordination was greater
and where defendants would wish to prove the opposite, for few cases would fall
in or near the leftmost region of Figure 7.79
The present setting, with a broad paradox region, is one in which the
choice to define agreement more restrictively, in terms of sets X and X0
(where, moreover, the set X is not too inclusive), has great consequences.
Most commentators seem to believe that high stakes rest on whether agree-
ment is thus defined, rather than being interpreted to encompass oligopolis-
tic interdependence generally. Accordingly, one might expect to see frequent
endorsements of factual propositions consistent with Figures 6 and 7, but
(as noted just above) the opposite is the norm—that is, statements are suggest-
ive of Figures 4 and 5, with a narrow paradox region. Furthermore, be-
cause belief that the debate over the rule of liability is important implies that
the X/X0 implementation involves a broad paradox region, one would expect
great attention to be devoted to the sorts of reversed positionings of the
parties described in subsection 3.4.3. That is, if one were to suppose that
most seriously contested cases are not at the far left of the horizontal axis,
then it would not merely be possible but typical for enforcers to argue from
the outset (the filing of their complaint) that collusion was difficult and de-
fendants that the industry was highly conducive to coordinated oligopolistic
pricing. Yet this too does not appear to be so. In sum, it seems that much
commentary on the subject, in failing to attend in a sustained manner to the
paradox of proof, reflects a lack of appreciation of the implications of different
choices of the legal rule.
Figure 7. Broad Paradox Region and Paradox of Proof.
Inferred Use of Acts in X Paradox Region
Ease of Coordination
0 1
79 It is possible that most filed cases would be frivolous, in the sense that there was indeed virtually no
prospect of collusion. In those cases, the left boundary in Figure 7 would be the operative one, and
conventional positionings could be expected.
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It is also useful to consider the differences between Figures 5 and 7—or 4 and
6. As drawn, the outcome in nearly all fact situations (for just about any degree
of ease of coordination) is reversed in the two depictions. (The exception is at
the extremes.) In other words, for a given legal rule in the form of X/X0, the
circumstantial evidence could be completely clear (even stipulated by the par-
ties) and yet, in most cases, opposite results would be possible. A case could be
toward the left end of the spectrum (short of the extreme), and either the en-
forcer or the defendants might be entitled to win; likewise toward the right end.
Who should win would depend on which of the two curves relating the ease of
coordination and the likelihood of acts in X is the true one, reinforcing the
importance of the analysis in subsection 3.4.3. Accordingly, it would be import-
ant for parties to present evidence on this question—although, as already noted,
little is known. Furthermore, uncertainty about which situation prevails in a
given case implies that there now is a double strategic paradox. The second is
that an enforcer would wish to argue that Figures 4 and 5 are correct—if the case
is likely to end up on the right half of the horizontal axis—but it would wish to
argue that Figures 6 and 7 depict the truth—if the case is likely to end up on the
left. And, again, the defendants’ strategic stance would be the opposite.
3.4.5. Countervailing Effects, Dependence on Legal Rule, and Endogeneity of Firms’ Behavior
There are a number of further complications in addition to those already
explored. Initially, let us revisit the basic assumptions behind the paradox of
proof diagrams, beginning with Figure 1, regarding the standard view that
implies that the likelihood of use of prohibited communications falls with the
ease of coordination once the ease becomes sufficiently high. This feature, which
is necessary to generate a paradox region, can be questioned on two grounds.
First, it is supposed that helpful acts in X become less valuable when condi-
tions are more conducive to coordination, at least once conduciveness exceeds
low to moderate levels. This relationship, however, need not be true (ignoring
potential liability). Simply put, the value of practices in X may well be increas-
ing, not decreasing, as conditions improve, even at high levels of conduciveness.
Certain sorts of communication may raise the expected average markup from,
say, 10% to 15% when conditions are moderately conducive but from 30% to
50% when they are very conducive. For example, price wars are far more costly
when prices are elevated substantially rather than modestly, so avoiding them is
more valuable in the former case. Accordingly, even toward the right of the
figures, incremental benefits from the use of acts in X may rise rather than fall as
the ease of coordination increases—and, if and when they do fall, they may not
decline until the ease of coordination is quite high and they may not fall as
much as seems generally to be supposed.
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Second, the paradox logic implicitly assumes that the risk of sanctions from
using acts in X is constant along the horizontal axis. However, some factors that
make coordination easier also make detection less likely. When there are fewer
firms, coordination is simpler, ceteris paribus. But it is also true that explicit
communications can be confined to fewer actors, making detection more dif-
ficult (see Hay & Kelley 1974, 20, 23–24 & n.15, 26–27; Masson & Reynolds
1978, 25–26). The probability of leaks and other means by which enforcers may
detect the communications falls, making the use of such communications less
dangerous. Similarly, if products are homogeneous or the environment is more
stable, there is less need for complex and frequent negotiations, which likewise
reduces the likelihood of detection. If the expected sanctions from direct de-
tection consequently fall reasonably rapidly, the likelihood of the use of pro-
hibited communications may be steadily rising as the ease of coordination
increases. It might then be true that only permitted means are employed to
attempt to achieve modest success when conditions are merely moderately
conducive but prohibited means are employed when conditions are more con-
ducive. Again, the result would be no paradox region at all.80
For these reasons, suggestions by some commentators and courts that highly
conducive conditions negate any inference that prohibited communications
were employed might be wrong. Indeed, such conditions would not only fail
to negate the inference, but they may instead strengthen it for most or even all
of the right portion of the diagrams, perhaps producing the situation depicted
in Figures 8 and 9.81 In such cases, there would be much less of a difference
between liability triggered by mere interdependence and a more restrictive rule
that limited liability to cases involving the use of prohibited communications
(or other specified acts, defining the set X). Under the direct approach of part 2,
one could choose a proof burden for conduciveness (taking as given the evi-
dence on the existence of successful oligopolistic coordination) that mirrors the
result produced under the communications-based prohibition. With only a
single boundary between no liability and liability, the remaining question
would be where optimally to set that boundary. This determination should
be governed by the analysis in subsection 2.1.3 directed at maximizing social
welfare, not by some calculus designed to meet a target likelihood that acts in
some set X were employed.
80 A related point is that the absence of smoking-gun evidence not only fails to indicate in general that
explicit, secret communications did not occur, but this lack of implication is especially notable in
cases in which conditions are highly conducive.
81 More moderately, the points in this subsection might explain why there would be a narrow paradox
region, as discussed in subsection 3.4.4 and depicted in Figures 4 and 5.
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The analysis throughout this section is also conditional on an assumed legal
prohibition, that is, a stipulation of which acts are deemed to be in set X versus
set X0. Obviously, if X is defined more narrowly, it will tend to be less likely that
a prohibited act was employed. As the definition of X is broadened, the curves
in the preceding figures will rise—the likelihood of some act in X having been
employed will be greater for a given ease of coordination. Furthermore, it is
apparent that a legal rule, and thus the corresponding sets X and X0, must be
defined rather precisely. After all, the factfinder must infer, often from complex
and remote circumstantial evidence, how likely it is that the defendants con-
fined themselves entirely to acts in X0 rather than having had to use at least one
act in set X. Knowing, say, merely that X is narrower than interdependence
alone (under which no particular act is required) tells us very little. Likewise,
knowing only that X is broader than a very precisely defined sort of explicit

















Figure 9. No Paradox of Proof.
Inferred Use of Acts in X
Ease of Coordination
0 1
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agreement (in which case only a few sorts of acts would be in X) provides
negligible guidance. As mentioned, those purporting to describe or advance a
legal prohibition in this form tend to offer neither an operational definition nor
a sequence of concrete illustrations of prohibited and permitted acts, so it is
quite difficult to know what set X is envisioned. Accordingly, it is mysterious
how a judgment on the likelihood of the use of prohibited communications is
supposed to be reached. When one adds that, under the paradox of proof, much
evidence may cut either way—depending on other evidence (and on beliefs
about the height and shape of the pertinent curve)—it is even harder to under-
stand the bases for inference under this approach.
Closely related is the level of enforcement. In suggesting that the likelihood of
the use of prohibited communications is low when the ease of coordination is
particularly low or high, the reasoning relied on the point that firms would not
risk sanctions by employing means that had little prospect of success or when
success was likely without resorting to them. However, if expected sanctions
were sufficiently low, firms would nevertheless employ illegal means in these
contexts. Similarly, in the middle region, where the likelihood of use of acts in X
is relatively high, the actual likelihood would be lower if expected sanctions
were greater; after all, the main purpose of sanctions is to achieve deterrence.
In addition, in making inferences about whether defendant firms were likely
to have employed acts in some given set X rather than confining themselves to
practices in set X0, further assumptions were made about firms’ understanding
of the legal system. However, these ignore an important interaction between
how firms chose acts and the method of inference employed. Notably, if the
determination of whether firms employed practices in X is based on inferences
from circumstantial evidence, and if such inferences are less likely to be
drawn when conditions are highly conducive to successful oligopolistic inter-
dependence, then why wouldn’t firms for this very reason become more
rather than less inclined to undertake acts in X when the ease of coordination
is high?
Such analysis is incomplete, in part because there will sometimes be another
route to liability, using direct evidence. It is generally believed, however, that,
conspirators’ ability to conceal their activity renders deterrence insufficient
unless circumstantial evidence is also considered. This desired supplemental
deterrence is what can be undermined by the logical inference process. Thus,
there appears to be a conundrum: If the use of prohibited communications is
not inferred because it is reasoned that firms will refrain from acts in X in the
stated circumstances, then there is no additional deterrence of such acts and
they will tend to be used. If the use of acts in X is inferred in the circumstances,
then there would be deterrence and the acts would tend not to be used. In either
case, the inference would be incorrect.
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The lesson is that all of the argument up until this point on the paradox of
proof needs to be modified—and, unfortunately, made more complex in yet
another manner—as a consequence of the endogeneity of firms’ behavior. It is
insufficient to reason that firms simply would or would not employ acts in X
because of the expected consequences. As a result, the best inference as to the
likelihood of the use of prohibited communications is at some intermediate
level. Firms’ decisions to employ any such acts will depend on how they expect
their acts to influence factfinders’ inferences regarding that likelihood. The
more an act raises the expected likelihood of liability, the more it will be
deterred, but such deterrence reduces the likelihood that it is logical for a
factfinder to assess. Accordingly, an inference process aimed at determining
whether the likelihood of the use of prohibited communications exceeds 50%
(or any other target probability) will need to find the balancing point (equilib-
rium) between these forces.82 (As subsection 2.1.3 mentions, however, it is
generally optimal to determine liability instead by balancing the social welfare
benefits of deterrence against the costs of chilling desirable behavior, both ex
ante considerations—and there is no reason to believe that such an approach
will yield some stipulated ex post likelihood of undesirable behavior.83)
Subsection 3.4.3 raises a number of complications concerning the inference
process implicitly (and logically) entailed by a selective prohibition on com-
munications (or other specified acts). The process is daunting due to the level of
complexity and the lack of an empirical basis for making the requisite deter-
minations. Considerations raised by the present subsection suggest that this
preliminary assessment was overly optimistic. Taken together, the analysis in
the whole of this section indicates that implementation of a communications-
based prohibition is immensely more challenging than is appreciated by its
advocates and also notably more so than entailed by the more direct approach
considered in part 2, which itself is often quite difficult to apply.
On reflection, it is apparent that commentators have not systematically con-
sidered the implications of taking seriously the sort of legal proscription that
they claim is reflected in existing law and constitutes sound policy. When this is
done, the result has a surreal air. The implications of the prevailing notion seem
82 Rational adjudicators interacting with rational firms (who all know that others think in the same
fashion) might be expected in equilibrium to employ mixed strategies: adjudicators might expect
firms to employ acts in X with a certain probability, which gives rise to probabilistic liability, with
firms employing acts in X that often. In reality, unobserved heterogeneity of firms might result in
determinate strategies. (If the probability of detection or the level of sanctions is sufficiently low, it is
instead an equilibrium for firms always to employ acts in X and for adjudicators always to infer that
acts in X are employed.)
83 This point is true more generally when determining optimal proof burdens. See Kaplow (2012a, b).
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quite fanciful, casting doubt on its descriptive validity (see Kaplow 2011c,
part III). However, these difficulties are distinct from the normative problem
that is the focus of this article: even if done well, the communications-based
prohibition is likely to be clearly inferior in terms of its effects on social welfare.
3.5. Comparison of Approaches: Deterrence, Chilling Effects, and Proof Burdens
The most important question in this article concerns how the two approaches
differ in terms of outcomes and resulting economic consequences. To compare
the direct approach to liability developed in section 2.2 with the communica-
tions-based prohibition considered here, it is useful to specify the former in
terms of the above diagrams, say, Figures 2 and 3. Suppose that the direct
approach would find liability when the ease of coordination is at least at the
left boundary of the liability region in those figures, or perhaps starting some-
what further to the right. Any outcome is a priori possible; selection of the
optimal boundary point, which can be understood as the optimal proof burden
on conduciveness taking as given other evidence, including that on successful
coordination, would be determined as discussed in subsection 2.1.3, on which
more in a moment.
Regarding deterrence, the communications-based prohibition would be
weaker (even nonexistent, depending on how well firms can predict factfinding)
in the right, paradox region. Because this region is where the social danger—the
expected harm from coordinated price elevation—is the greatest, this disad-
vantage of basing liability on the presence of particular communications is
substantial. In this regard, one should also keep in mind that, as explained in
section 2.1.2, the net expected harm from oligopoly pricing rises dispropor-
tionately with the magnitude of price elevation; for example, when elevations
are likely to be twice as great, social harm will be significantly more than
double.84 Likewise, under the communications-based prohibition, deterrence
is maintained in the middle region, and (depending on how proof burdens are
set under the direct approach) may be, in comparison, relatively strongest
toward the left of that region, which is where expected harm per event is lowest.
Consideration of chilling costs also seems adverse to the communications-
based prohibition if one considers the costs per unit of enforcement or deter-
rence. In an absolute sense, if liability is reduced—say, the prospect is the same
in the middle region and negligible in the paradox region—total chilling costs
will fall. But we should be concerned with the significance of chilling costs
relative to deterrence benefits. Toward the middle of the diagrams, where
84 However, the loss in consumer surplus, although still increasing with the price elevation, does so at a
decreasing rate. See Kaplow (2011b).
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conduciveness is moderate (including cases toward the left of that region, where
it is not very high), errors in identifying successful coordination are greatest, as
explained in subsection 2.2.1.2. All else equal, it is less plausible that coordin-
ation is taking place when conditions are relatively unconducive. Moreover, any
success achieved is likely to be smaller in magnitude, and mistakes are more
likely when elevations are small. Likewise, error seems less likely as one moves
toward the right in the diagram and least likely in the paradox region. In sum,
the communications-based prohibition aims at cases where collusion is not as
easy, which will tend to include a relatively higher fraction of cases in which
collusion is less likely to exist, so false positives that produce chilling costs will
tend to be relatively more frequent. Furthermore, chilling costs are most serious
in industries that are truly competitive, or very nearly so, which will be more
likely to be true as one moves toward the left along the horizontal axis.
Combining these two observations suggests that a communications-based
prohibition exonerates firms in cases in which the tradeoff of deterrence bene-
fits and chilling costs is most favorable to liability and imposes sanctions when
the tradeoff is relatively less favorable. To dramatize this point, compare this
prohibition to a direct one that imposes a particular burden of proof on con-
duciveness: specifically, such that liability begins at the border between the
middle and right regions, that is, at the left border of the paradox region. In
other words, liability in the middle and right regions is the opposite of what
would prevail under the communications-based prohibition. And, to ease the
exposition, suppose that there are the same number of cases in the middle and
right regions.85 Compare Figure 30, slightly altered from the original Figure 3,
with Figure 300, reflecting the just-described modification.
This comparison provokes a simple question: all else equal, how do we feel
about imposing liability just in cases that pose moderate danger (Figure 30)—
the situation under the communications-based prohibition—or just in cases
that pose high danger (Figure 300)—as under this particular implementation of
the direct approach of part 2? Since deterrence benefits are higher and chilling
costs are lower, possibly to a great degree, under the direct approach, it would
obviously be superior. That is, there exists a way to set the proof burden under
85 This assumption is unrealistic; it would only hold by chance. Moreover, the number of cases in each
region depends on the liability rule, and what we care about for ex ante effects are the number of
settings influenced rather than the number of cases. In any event, the discussion in the text is merely
suggestive and one could modify the burden of proof to produce the desired comparison. For
example, to get the same number of affected markets under each rule, the proof burden under
the direct approach of part 2 might turn out to be further to the left. Then we would have an
intermediate region—from that point on the horizontal axis up to the border with the paradox
region—where the treatment under the two rules was the same, and the difference would be between
the remaining regions, which by construction would affect the same number of settings.
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the approach of part 2 such that it clearly, and perhaps overwhelmingly, dom-
inates the communications-based prohibition.86
More broadly, the concern with chilling costs due to the prospect of false
positives is optimally confronted directly. Notably, it may make sense to in-
crease the proof burden on whether successful oligopolistic coordination has
taken place, rather than focusing only on conduciveness, which is but one
consideration bearing on the central question of concern. Likewise, it may be
appropriate to give less weight to particular types of evidence of more ques-
tionable reliability. In contrast, it is not optimal to exonerate defendants in a
wide range of cases that pose the greatest danger and least chilling cost, includ-
ing those in which the overall proof is strongest. Put another way, because a
greater ease of coordination tends to be associated with both greater deterrence
benefits and lower chilling costs—which is why it is identified in subsection
2.2.1.2 as a consideration favorable to liability—it is truly perverse to count it
backwards in the strongest cases for liability.
The preceding point focuses on setting the proof burden under the direct
approach. It is also revealing to consider adjusting the burden of proof with
Figure 30. Ease of Coordination and Paradox of Proof (Modiﬁed).
Inferred Use of Acts in X Paradox Region
Ease of Coordination
0 1




86 The proof burden that gives rise to this sharp comparison will, of course, be best only by chance. The
optimal burden might be higher or lower; but, in any case, since it is optimal, the results would
necessarily be superior to those under the burden stipulated here for ease of comparison.
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regard to market-based inferences under the communications-based prohib-
ition. To see the effects, recall the horizontal dotted line in Figure 2 that indi-
cates where the probability of use of acts in X is 0.50, so that above that line such
use is more likely than not. Raising the burden would involve setting a higher
probability threshold and thus raising the horizontal line; conversely for a lower
burden. The resulting tradeoff from either adjustment has a mixed quality. For
example, raising the burden slightly may well be desirable with regard to the left
boundary between liability and no liability because those cases in which liability
is no longer deemed to exist pose a low danger of social harm and a significant
possibility of chilling costs—that is, relative to the group of scenarios in which
liability was initially assessed. However, the effect may be adverse at the right
boundary, between the liability and paradox regions, because those
now-exonerated cases involve relatively high danger and low chilling costs—
compared to cases in the interior of the middle region, where liability is
retained. That is, raising the proof burden under a communications-based
prohibition exonerates both the weakest and strongest cases in terms of the
social welfare consequences of liability.
This unfortunate—indeed, perverse—tradeoff is avoidable. Under the de-
picted circumstances, moving each boundary toward the right would be a
better way to improve social welfare—supposing that liability is indeed desir-
able for some of the cases in the liability region. Doing so would entail a rela-
tively higher burden toward the left of the horizontal axis—exonerating the
weakest cases, as with a straightforward rise in the burden of proof—and a
relatively lower burden toward the right—now resulting in broader liability
rather than greater exoneration for the strongest cases.
Similar logic favors moving the right boundary all the way to the right—
eliminating the paradox region—and setting the left boundary of the liability
region wherever the tradeoff between deterrence benefits and chilling costs is
optimized. But, of course, this realignment would abandon the communica-
tions-based prohibition embodied in the sets X and X0 and replace it with the
direct approach from part 2. This conclusion is hardly surprising; the reasoning
merely recasts the logic from just above.
This point restates the theme with which this part opens, namely, that
part 2 states the nature of the social problem and then considers how to go
about detection and setting sanctions in an optimal fashion, that which maxi-
mizes social welfare. Since nothing like the communications-based approach
emerged from that analysis, we knew from the outset that such a liability
regime would not be optimal. Moreover, if we state some liability regime
that differs from what is optimal and ask how it can be improved, we might
expect that reshaping its boundaries to move it toward the previously
identified optimal regime would make sense. The present analysis makes this
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idea concrete by articulating the initial differences and explaining how the
deterrence and chilling effects change as one liability regime is morphed into
the other.
In this regard, it must be recalled from section 2.1.3 that the welfare-based
approach does not define false positives and false negatives relative to some
formal statement of a liability rule but rather in terms of how findings of
liability and of no liability in various settings will influence firms’ behavior,
for better or worse, in terms of effects on social welfare. Commentators who
favor a communications-based approach object to liability in the paradox
region and thereby view liability in such cases as involving false positives.
But such false positives are defined by reference to this formal standard
for liability, whose desirability is in question. As discussed throughout this
section, the prospect of liability in the paradox region tends to be especially
valuable in terms of deterrence and less costly in terms of chilling effects
than is liability in the middle region, where the posited approach would hold
firms liable. The core “chilling effect” of liability in the paradox region con-
sists of deterrence of coordinated price elevation, and it is deterrence in
settings involving the greatest social harm. Hence, when the social object-
ive motivating the legal prohibition is the focus of the analysis, the error
tradeoff is assessed quite differently—and properly. This divergence between
a rule based on the use of acts in a set X and one designed in light of the
social objective is also what explains why the simple device of adjusting
the proof burden upward or downward (raising or lowering the horizontal
dotted line in Figure 2) is such a blunt—and odd—way to fine-tune a legal
regime.
3.6. Sanctions
The subject of optimal sanctions is considered in section 2.3. Discussion here
focuses on differences that arise when employing a communications-based
prohibition rather than when basing liability on the presence of successful oli-
gopolistic coordination.
First, as mentioned before, many (but not all) of the methods of demonstrat-
ing successful oligopolistic coordination also directly indicate the magnitude of
price elevation and thus provide a basis for setting fines and damages. When
liability is triggered by the use of some prohibited act rather than proven oli-
gopolistic price elevation, additional inquiry for purposes of calibrating sanc-
tions will often be necessary. One implication of this point is that, even in cases
in which there is decisive internal or other direct evidence of prohibited com-
munications, the expense and complexity involved with assessing market-based
evidence will not be avoided.
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Second, with a communications-based prohibition, there is an additional
problem that concerns the pertinent baseline. As section 2.3 notes, the bench-
mark for setting fines and damages is (in principle) related to the extent of
firms’ overcharge. Under the direct approach, the overcharge is the difference
between the actual price charged and a competitive price. However, if the vio-
lation is defined in terms of the use of prohibited communications, the use of
acts in a set X, then it may seem logical for the benchmark not to be the
competitive price but rather the possibly elevated price that the firms could
have charged had they confined their behavior to acts in the set X0. After all,
such price elevation is deemed to be legal under this regime, so the incremental
harm attributable to the firms’ illegal activity is limited to the magnitude of the
further price increase made possible by using acts in X. It is not the entire gap
between price and marginal cost at the competitive level of output.87
Accordingly, a government intending to levy a fine that was a function of
harm caused by the violation or a plaintiff hoping to recover damages would
need to show not only that illegal methods were used but also how much of the
price elevation could be attributed to the use of such means. In cases in which
proof is by circumstantial evidence and the factfinder infers that the defendants’
actions barely crossed the line demarcating liability, damages under this for-
mulation could be quite small. But the implications of having to identify the
increment above plain, interdependent oligopoly prices are not so limited. Even
in a clear case of express conspiracy—smoke-filled rooms, taped conversations,
and criminal convictions—it is possible that, but for the prohibited inter-
actions, the firms would have elevated price above a competitive level, although
perhaps not as high, for as long, or with as few price wars.
This additional requirement could prove quite challenging. First, one would
have to determine which of the acts the defendants employed are in set X and
which other acts they might have used in addition or could have used instead
are in the set X0. Then, one would have to assess the degree of price elevation
under both scenarios. That is, one would need to know the extent of successful
price elevation in fact (even if this is not required for liability, established
87 Basing damages on this full gap seems more in accordance with current practice, thus constituting
one of the respects in which existing law in action is more consistent with successful oligopolistic
coordination being sufficient for liability. For elaboration on this logic and on the law in the United
States, see Kaplow (2011c, sec. III.C.4). In brief, the general rule is that damages must be causally
related to the actions that give rise to liability. See, e.g., Areeda et al. (2007, 332–333). However, this
general principle does not seem to be followed (assuming the validity of commentators’ character-
izations of existing law on liability), with damages instead ordinarily reflecting the degree to which
price is elevated above the competitive level. See id. at 377. Although this discrepancy has gone
largely unnoticed, the point has been raised by the defendants’ expert in at least one important case.
See White (2001, 28).
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perhaps by evidence of interfirm communications) as well as what it would have
been if the defendants’ had confined themselves to acts in X0. In determining the
latter, there may be dispute over which acts, not necessarily ones actually used,
would be legal (in addition to expected disputes over which acts actually found
to have been employed were legal, even granting that some were illegal). And, of
course, there would be significant disagreement about the extent to which
prices might have been elevated if only such legal means were employed.
Given how little is understood about this sort of question and the hypothetical
nature of the inquiry, the need for this additional determination seems quite
problematic.88 Furthermore, even if this determination can be made well, de-
terrence of socially harmful price elevation is undermined thereby—although
this problem is better attributed to the rule of liability that permits successful
(even and perhaps especially very successful) coordinated price elevation as
long as prohibited communications are not (and we can now add, need not
be) employed.
The main point with regard to fines and damages is that further complication
is introduced by the communications-based prohibition, in addition to the
detection difficulties that are the focus of sections 3.4 and 3.5. The social con-
sequence is a more costly and error-prone adjudication process in addition to
one that is less effective in advancing social welfare even without regard to
administrative concerns.
In contrast, the analysis of imprisonment of individuals, usually within a
firm, for violation of a selective prohibition on communications is fairly similar
to that under the more direct approach. One difference might concern the
relative importance of imprisonment as a supplemental sanction. As previously
explained, a key rationale involves remedying any deterrence deficit present
when only fines (and private damages) are employed. Because firms may be
sanctioned in a narrower class of circumstances when liability requires proof of
the use of an act in set X, there may be less deterrence due to a lower probability
of sanctions and thus arguably a reason to employ higher sanctions, possibly
including imprisonment. However, what matters is whether firms know ex ante
the situation they will be deemed to occupy ex post. Perhaps some firms that
would have anticipated sanctions under a prohibition on successful oligopol-
istic coordination will expect sanctions under the narrower prohibition with a
88 Similar challenges would be posed in determining overcharges in standard ways, which often involve
comparisons to other markets or to behavior before or after the period of illegal activity. Notably,
there may be disputes about whether acts in X or solely acts in X0 were employed in those com-
parison markets or time periods. To be sure, challenges arise with these comparisons under both
approaches because it may be necessary to determine the extent of interdependence (however ac-
complished) in the comparison markets.
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positive—because they are using acts in X, or might be found to have done so—
but lower probability. Others, those well into the paradox region, may expect to
be found liable with a low probability under a communications-based prohib-
ition, so raising sanctions may not have much deterrent effect on them. A
possibly countervailing consideration concerns chilling costs. Although there
may be negligible cost from chilling acts in X, the communications-based pro-
hibition disproportionately targets settings with a lower danger of coordination
and a correspondingly greater likelihood of striking competitive behavior (as
explained in section 3.5), so lower sanctions than otherwise might be optimal.
Another difference concerns the evidence required to identify the particular
individuals who are to be subject to imprisonment (or personal fines). First, this
process may seem easier under the communications-based prohibition since
the prohibited class of acts might be defined more clearly—although the op-
posite is also possible, as suggested by the longstanding lack of a clear definition
of what such a prohibition entails. Second, some evidence that might be clear
under a broader prohibition may be ambiguous under a narrower one. Except
for individuals caught on tape, it may be difficult to prove that others, such as
their supervisors or other individuals who may have acted on the achieved
interfirm understanding, knew that the resulting meeting of the minds was
obtained using means in the set X rather than solely through acts in X0. It
seems that it would be especially difficult to identify particular individuals
with the requisite knowledge in a case proved primarily by circumstantial evi-
dence. Of course, under the broader prohibition on successful oligopolistic
coordination, the proof burden for sanctions against individuals may need to
be high, and it might primarily be met when there is powerful internal evidence
or proof of specific, explicit interfirm communications linked to the individual
defendants in question.
The analysis of injunctions in section 2.3 establishes a number of propos-
itions that are also pertinent to a communications-based prohibition. First, it is
not obvious that injunctions are important (or that they are frequently used).
This point is especially significant with regard to deterrence but also has im-
plications for subsequent compliance because fines and imprisonment could
likewise be used without any need for an injunction, and, when there is an
injunction, it is still necessary to use other sanctions to ensure that firms have an
incentive to comply with it.
This latter point is not obviously much different when the prohibition
applies to particular communications rather than to successful oligopolistic
coordination. Suppose that firms are caught having used some acts in X and
that an injunction proscribes future use of those acts (or perhaps a broader set
than those used, such as all acts in X). Proving the original violation may have
been difficult, as suggested by the analysis in sections 3.3 and 3.4. If it was
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proved by catching individuals on tape, one might have to catch them again, in
the future, to prove that they violated the injunction. Even if violations con-
tinue, it might be difficult to detect them because of inherent obstacles as
well as the fact that firms will be extremely cautious, having been caught
once. Internal monitoring might be imposed, but this supplement would aid
future deterrence regardless of the type of sanction employed. Alternatively,
future violations might be established by circumstantial evidence. In either case,
just as before, it would be necessary to replicate the detection and sanctioning
process, which is little different from what must be done in the absence of an
injunction.89
Consider the case in which the available proof of a continuing violation
consists primarily of ongoing successful oligopolistic coordination. Should
it be inferred that some acts in X were employed? If such was previously
inferred from this type of evidence, on the grounds that the conduciveness of
conditions placed the case in the liability region rather than the paradox re-
gion, the same inference might be drawn again. At that point, there may be
little difference (going forward) between a communications-based prohib-
ition and a broader proscription on coordinated pricing. This result should
not be surprising since the two rules tend to reach similar outcomes in such
settings.
Alternatively, defendant firms might argue that, even if it was appropriate to
infer their use of prohibited communications in the past, such should not be
inferred in the future because, having learned well about each others’ predilec-
tions and methods of signaling, elaborate coordination is now possible without
resort to acts in X. Nevertheless, one might associate the future behavior with
the prior use of acts in X and thus deem it to be attributable to illegal activity
under the communications-based prohibition, which would constitute a fur-
ther move in the direction of a broader prohibition on successful oligopolistic
coordination. As discussed in section 2.3, many commentators would be both-
ered by such a regime since they seem not to comprehend how rational agents
could desist from profitable behavior (price elevation). But it was explained
there how, once sanctions are contemplated, the behavior is no longer profit-
able (if expected sanctions are sufficiently high), so self-interest would produce
the desired effect.
89 It might seem appealing to switch the burden of proof to the defendants once they have been
demonstrated to have committed a violation, but it is not clear how this would function. After
all, there is no direct way to demonstrate the relevant negative—that the firms are no longer using
any acts in X—except by a failure to prove the positive directly or through circumstantial evidence.
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4. ADDIT IONAL CONSIDERATIONS
4.1. Alternative: Disallowance of Circumstantial Evidence
Much of the difficulty with a communications-based prohibition arises in con-
nection with the use of circumstantial evidence, which gives rise to the paradox
of proof. Inferences are complex, costly, and error-prone, and, even when the
process works well, the results are problematic in that cases posing the greatest
danger lead to no sanctions whereas liability tends to be concentrated on cases
involving less social harm but greater chilling costs. Accordingly, it may make
sense to consider an alternative formulation of the communications-based pro-
hibition that seeks to avoid some of these problems by disallowing the use of
circumstantial evidence—that is, a regime that still requires proof of the use of
an act in some specified set X (rather than solely the use of acts in X0) but
imposes the further requirement that such use be demonstrated entirely
through the use of direct evidence. On one hand, such an approach is radical
in a formal, legal sense. As mentioned in subsection 3.4.1, it is a central tenet of
competition law and conspiracy law more broadly that circumstantial evidence
may be employed. Moreover, use of such evidence is generally thought to be
particularly important in realms such as the present one in which parties hide
activities that give rise to liability. On the other hand, criminal price-fixing
prosecutions (that occur mainly in the United States), which target individuals
for incarceration, seem to require direct, explicit, even smoking-gun evidence of
prohibited communications, presumably due in significant part to high proof
burdens and perhaps also the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In any event,
this more restrictive approach to liability (for all sanctions) deserves some
attention.90
First, chilling effects tend to be reduced when a legal prohibition is narrowed.
Reducing the use of less reliable evidence is particularly likely to be helpful in
this regard. This factor—along with savings in administrative costs—is the chief
motivation for considering this more restrictive alternative. This benefit, how-
ever, may require that the range of permissible evidence be sharply limited.
False positives and concomitant chilling effects may still arise due to the am-
biguity and unreliability of direct evidence that is not of a smoking-gun variety.
90 A number of additional issues should be noted: there is no clear boundary between circumstantial
and direct evidence (even a tape recording is only direct evidence of talking, not of whether the
speakers are serious, have authority, or took any actions). As mentioned below, much internal
evidence will be ambiguous. Informants may be untrustworthy. Market-based evidence may still
be required to calibrate sanctions. And such a highly circumscribed approach does not obviously
solve the dilemma addressed in section 4.4 regarding the screening of cases—namely, that if such
evidence is required up front, deterrence may suffer greatly, but if it is not, then few cases may be
eliminated at early stages.
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For example, an enforcer may identify various internal fragments, such as from
emails, that can be interpreted to demonstrate illegality, even though defend-
ants offer contrary interpretations. Furthermore, exclusion of circumstantial,
market-based evidence may raise the pressure to accept dubious but direct
proof and will also sometimes undermine defendants’ attempts to demonstrate
that they actually behaved competitively. Nevertheless, if a sufficiently tough
limitation is imposed, false positives would be less likely, possibly by a substan-
tial margin compared to the unrestricted communications-based prohibition
analyzed in part 3.
Second, disallowance of circumstantial evidence would presumably reduce
deterrence because liability could no longer be successfully established in cer-
tain settings. One could attempt to remedy the shortfall through higher sanc-
tions.91 There are, of course, limits to this stratagem, including its selectivity:
across-the-board increases in penalties may be adequate or excessive in some
settings (where firms believe that discovery of their use of acts in the set X is
reasonably likely) but remain insufficient in those in which firms know in
advance that their actions are unlikely to give rise to liability under the circum-
scribed rule.
Successful oligopolistic coordination may not involve any acts in X, and, for
that which does, it is unknown what portion generates the sort of direct evi-
dence that a highly restricted prohibition would credit. For the former group,
we already know that a communications-based prohibition, requiring proof of
acts in X, exonerates firms in cases involving the greatest social danger and
relatively low chilling concerns. Among those cases that remain, there is the
further point raised in subsection 3.4.5 that detection tends to be most difficult
when there are few firms and the coordination problem is easiest, that is, the
cases involving relatively large harm within the group of cases that actually
involve acts in X. Finally, empirical evidence does not give us confidence that
existing deterrence is adequate, both because there appears to be significant
oligopolistic price elevation in many parts of the economy and because the very
number and magnitude of price elevations in prosecuted cases suggests a de-
terrence shortfall, indicating that the probability of detection may be quite low
(see Kaplow 2011a, sec. II.D).
For this circumscribed communications-based prohibition to have any
chance of being on a par with the more direct approach of part 2, it would
91 In addition, one might increase enforcement intensity, such as by undertaking more undercover
operations, employing a lower threshold for wiretapping, pursuing weaker leads, and so forth. The
extent to which this alternative is feasible or desirable depends on the aggressiveness of current
enforcement, among other things.
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have to be that market-based and other circumstantial evidence—when used
correctly—adds little to the ability to achieve deterrence of coordinated oligop-
olistic price elevation92 while notably raising the likelihood of false positives
that generate chilling effects and also augmenting administrative costs. If this is
true, note that it is the radical reduction in admissible evidence—rather than
the fact that one is generally looking for the use of acts in X rather than evidence
of oligopolistic coordination—that generates the alternative rule’s possible ad-
vantages. It follows, therefore, that if such limited evidence sufficed to achieve
substantial deterrence, other reliable evidence rarely existed, and the chilling
costs of allowing further channels of proof (relaxing the proof burden) were
great, essentially the same result would be obtained under the direct approach.
The main difference is that sharp, direct evidence of the socially undesirable
phenomenon—successful coordinated price elevation—rather than powerful
evidence of a symptom that is not a necessary condition to harm—the use of
an act in some set X—would be the trigger for liability. The difference would be
small if virtually any evidence unambiguous enough to be admitted involved
both.93
4.2. Implications for Other Competition Law Rules
It is understood that different aspects of competition policy are interrelated;
what is optimal in one area depends in part on how other rules are set. The most
important application of this principle concerns the oligopoly problem. It is
92 See also infra section 4.3 (on the possible erosion of smoking-gun evidence due to innovation in
electronic communications).
93 If a highly circumscribed approach to addressing price elevation by direct competitors was optimal,
in significant part due to doubts about factfinders’ abilities, it would seem that the law on monop-
olization, vertical practices, and mergers—areas that rely much more heavily on complex economic
evidence and circumstantial evidence more broadly—should be extremely restrictive if not a nullity.
After all, the social dangers in these other areas are often more ambiguous. Some commentators
skeptical of the value of competition regimes endorse such a view. See, e.g., Bork (1978, 405–407);
Crandall & Winston (2003, 24) (“Until economists have hard evidence that the current antitrust
statutes and the institutions that administer them are generating social benefits, the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice should focus on the most significant and egregious
violations, such as blatant price fixing and merger-to-monopoly and treat most other apparent
threats to competition with benign neglect.”); and Easterbrook (1984, 3) (“But suits against mergers
more often than not have attacked combinations that increased efficiency, and the dissolution of
mergers has led to higher prices in the product market. There are good theoretical reasons to believe
that the costs of other enforcement efforts have exceeded the benefits.”). How restrictive a skeptic
should be will depend on institutional considerations, such as whether adjudication is by expert
tribunal, generalist judge, or lay jury and on whether prosecutorial discretion can be relied on to help
moderate possible excesses of broader prohibitions. (For the latter to be effective, the prosecutor
may need a monopoly on enforcement authority, for if private parties or numerous enforcers in
other jurisdictions may each independently decide whether to bring a case, then it is the behavior of
the most aggressive enforcer that will determine the actual scope of application.)
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generally believed that the difficulty of directly attacking interdependent oli-
gopoly pricing warrants a tougher policy toward horizontal mergers in order to
render markets structurally less conducive to coordinated price elevation (see,
e.g., Baker 1993, 199–207; Brock 2006, 280; Kaysen & Turner 1959, 44–45, 127–
141).94 Of course, greater strictness comes at a cost in terms of forgone gains in
productive efficiency and inhibition of the market for corporate control that
provides important discipline for managers.
Conversely, to the extent that competition law is more aggressive against
successful oligopolistic coordination, interdependent price elevation is more
broadly and effectively deterred. Moreover, as emphasized in the analysis of
the paradox of proof in section 3.5, the difference under a direct approach is
greatest in industries that are most conducive to substantial price elevation.
This beneficial result would, accordingly, make it sensible to pursue a somewhat
more relaxed approach toward horizontal mergers, with concomitant gains.95
The legal approach toward successful oligopolistic coordination also has
implications for competition law rules that relate even more directly to coor-
dinated oligopoly pricing. By analogy to tougher merger enforcement, many
likewise advocate an aggressive approach toward facilitating practices (see, e.g.,
Baker 1993, 207–219).96 The same tradeoff is evident: if pricing behavior cannot
be reached directly, it becomes necessary to make more practices illegal—
whether per se illegal or subject to stricter scrutiny under a rule of reason
(stricter because the competitive danger is presumed to be larger). The problem
is that there exists, for example, much exchange of information that generates
efficiencies, such as in standard-setting and other trade association activities
94 Similar logic also applies to proposals to deconcentrate existing industries.
95 A central thrust of Posner’s criticism of Turner, who pushed for a strongly prophylactic merger
policy both in his writing and as chief of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, is that the
resulting inefficiency was a further cost of lax treatment of oligopoly pricing. See Posner (1969, 1566,
1598–1605); see also Demsetz (1973, 3) (suggesting a preference for attacking collusion over tough
anti-merger policies that would decrease efficiency).
Relating merger law to price-fixing law raises additional conundrums, at least under a regime like that
in the United States which permits private suits for damages. Since a merger itself is clearly a “contract,
combination . . . , or conspiracy,” the agreement requirement of Sherman Act Section 1 is satisfied, so a
demonstration that the merger elevated prices would indicate a violation and hence support a claim for
treble damages from the resulting overcharge. Just as mergers may be blocked by the government as
anticompetitive if they significantly raise the prospects for coordinated pricing, regardless of the means
by which coordination might be accomplished, so pure interdependence would provide a basis for sub-
sequent damages. Accordingly, after mergers, existing law seems in principle to allow private suits for
successful oligopolistic coordination, as long as the merger can be shown to contribute to the coordination.
96 See also Kaplow (2011c, sec. II.B.2) (further discussing the subject and offering additional references
to the literature).
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concerned with technological developments, forecasts of demand, and predic-
tions of costs.97
4.3. Electronic Communications
Advances in communications technology may alter the detection problem.
Indeed, changes in the last decade or two are already changing the landscape.98
One problem is that new technologies make rapid, highly detailed price signal-
ing easier. Prices, or elaborate price schemes, can be posted, modified, and
rescinded at little cost and in ways that few would notice aside from onlooking
competitors (thereby avoiding interim sales transactions). In addition to prices
themselves, other product attributes, views about future trends (that may be
code for pricing invitations and responses), and other information can be
posted on web sites. Firm representatives can participate in (possibly facially
anonymous) blogs, chat rooms, and the like. And even old-fashioned press
conferences can be replaced with or supplemented by webcasts, greetings,
and other online messages.
If all such behavior is to be permitted—that is, not included in the set X of
prohibited acts—then successful oligopolistic coordination through legally pri-
vileged means becomes easier. One implication might be a broader paradox
region. On the other hand, if all such behavior is reached, then it is hard to see
the limit short of prohibiting all interdependence. It seems difficult to chart a
middle course of attempting to delineate a substantial portion of such activity as
included in the set X while placing the rest in X0—and perhaps pointless, as long
as enough is in the latter. Furthermore, the speed and unpredictability of future
developments may cause newly refined rules tied to particular sorts of commu-
nication to be obsolete on arrival.
A second problem concerns detection. To the extent that one does not rely
much on inferences from circumstantial evidence—raising the paradox of
proof, or being disallowed under the alternative approach sketched in section
4.1—and thus depends primarily on obtaining smoking-gun evidence or near
equivalents, the task may become more difficult over time. Detailed codes
might be communicated through delays of various numbers of milliseconds
in price or other web postings. And the use of VOIP (voice over Internet
protocol) or other developing technologies may allow direct communications
97 Note further that, as one expands the set of facilitating practices that are made illegal, which can be
seen as broadening the set X, the paradox region (e.g., in Figures 2 and 3) shrinks, but, as explained
in subsection 3.4.4, once the paradox region becomes narrow, it is hard to understand why one
would insist on the acts-based prohibition.
98 Although not drawing the implications considered here, concerns are noted in Baker (1996) and
Borenstein (2004).
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that are nearly impossible to trace; cell phones already pose significant chal-
lenges for law enforcement.
The more public methods discussed just before are also relevant. Currently,
many attempts at coordination require multiple meetings over time to account
for various complications and changing conditions. But with new technology, it
may be possible to have very few initial meetings to choose legally permitted (or
illegal but extremely difficult to trace) ways to conduct future interchanges. By
greatly reducing in-person and other potentially detectable contact, the likeli-
hood of discovery could fall substantially.
Not all advances in communications, however, make detection more diffi-
cult. As email use has become compulsive for many people, individuals engaged
in questionable or illegal activity may leave more traces, ones that advanced
search algorithms may be able to locate afterwards. For example, in the
Microsoft cases in the 1990s, despite presumably sophisticated legal advice,
many damaging emails were produced—and ultimately discovered—whereas
in the past such communications might have been primarily oral (see, e.g.,
Heilemann 2000). Likewise with the Whole Foods merger (see, e.g., Levy 2007).
It is unclear which of these features will become more important in the
future. If permitted methods of communication become sufficient or if pro-
hibited communications can readily be routed through undetectable channels,
the already serious problem of detection may become worse. This concern is
especially great if increasingly elaborate legal channels become available, be-
cause even finding email trails documenting their use would be to no avail.
Note, in contrast, that direct targeting of successful oligopolistic coordin-
ation tends to mitigate these problems. Market-based evidence will continue to
be available. Internal evidence may be somewhat harder to come by, but it may
still be very useful as long as large numbers of employees (and sometimes
consultants or other agents) need to be involved in planning, making, and
executing firms’ decisions. Indeed, the main force easing detection—the
growth of email and other channels that are difficult to erase—may enhance
the power of internal evidence in determining whether coordinated oligopoly
pricing took place, overcoming efforts by lawyers and others to mask firms’
analysis and decision-making. As a result, these technological developments
may, as a whole, make a selective communications prohibition even less at-
tractive over time.
4.4. Dispositive Motions
Because so much of the total expense of adjudication is borne before an ac-
tual trial commences (investigation, discovery, experts), significant benefits
are realized if meritless cases can be dismissed up front. The problem is that,
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at the outset, there is very little basis for ascertaining whether cases of the
sort examined here have merit. Even under the communications-based
prohibition, as long as proof by circumstantial evidence is allowed, an enforcer
(private party or government agent) would be in a position to allege that,
taking into account all manner of evidence concerning whether the market
in question is conducive to successful oligopolistic coordination and whether
such successful coordination is taking place, the use of at least some act in
X is sufficiently likely under the prevailing legal standard. Without reviewing
all of the pertinent evidence (which the enforcer is presumed not to have
expended much effort in gathering at the motion-to-dismiss stage), how
is an adjudicator to assess such a claim? Moreover, as developed in subsection
3.4.3, under the communications-based prohibition virtually any piece of
evidence and thus virtually any factual allegation could favor either a
finding of liability or of no liability, depending on the strength with which
the allegation is deemed to hold as well as the strength of other allegations
and evidence.
This seeming impossibility of rendering a negative judgment at so prelimin-
ary a stage is part of what lends appeal to the alternative discussed in section 4.1
of prohibiting all circumstantial evidence—requiring direct evidence of pro-
hibited communications, and possibly even smoking-gun evidence. However,
in the absence of an informer who comes forward early in the process,99 it is
difficult to see how even this narrower question can be resolved at the begin-
ning. After all, we are considering whether a case can be removed from the
system before any discovery or extensive investigation by an enforcer. But if
cases rise or fall primarily or entirely on the sort of evidence that can be gleaned,
not from pricing or other behavior that might be publicly observable, but only
from internal evidence deeply hidden in the defendant firms, it would seem that
either all cases (except those with an informant) would need to be dismissed, or
that essentially none could be disposed of at this preliminary stage.100 An al-
ternative approach would be to rely more on market-based evidence, some of
which is publicly available, at this preliminary stage, switching to the other at
99 Importantly, a significant impetus to informers coming forward is the fear of successful prosecution.
But if prosecution is rendered essentially impossible without informants, and if prospective inform-
ants know this, informants would be harder to come by.
100 The U.S. Supreme Court in Twombly acted as if it had an answer, but what it might be does not seem
possible to extract from the opinions in that case (which do not directly consider the dilemma
discussed in the text). See Kaplow (2011c, secs. III.B.2, III.E and n.199). This problem is the subject
of ongoing research by the author.
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later stages (if a communications-based prohibition governs), such as judgment
just before trial or in the adjudication itself.101
It remains to consider the disposal of cases after all investigation, discovery,
and preparation of expert reports, but before trial. This possibility is especially
important when the just-described, more preliminary proceeding cannot screen
very powerfully. However, it too is more difficult than is usually imagined.
Unless a party’s case has negligible evidentiary support, it seems difficult for
an adjudicator to find that a trial is unnecessary without in essence conducting
the trial to determine whether the evidence is sufficiently strong. In the United
States, courts often grant defendants’ pre-trial motions for summary judgment
in antitrust cases, and a reading of the opinions suggests that some in essence do
resolve substantial factual disputes that, in principle, they are supposed to
avoid—by denying the motion and allowing trial to proceed. One limitation
in achievable cost savings is that such decisions come only after many costs are
sunk. Also, because judges are not supposed to resolve cases in this manner,
they cannot organize proceedings in a way that best enables them to make the
requisite decisions.102
4.5. Fit with Legal Doctrine
As stated in the Introduction, this article compares price-fixing regimes in
terms of their ability to maximize welfare and does not address existing law,
which is the subject of a detailed treatment in a preceding work (Kaplow
2011c), only a few points of which will be mentioned here. This section never-
theless briefly considers the fit of different approaches with legal doctrine.
On one hand, many commentators and recent court decisions in the United
States and European Union state that existing law is best understood as some-
thing akin to the selective communications prohibition articulated in section
3.1. From the outset, however, there are caveats. To begin, most state the rule
instead as one requiring some sort of express or explicit agreement or concert of
action, although, as explained, it seems that a selective communications
101 Intelligibly assessing the former at a highly preliminary stage (or even on the eve of trial, as discussed
next) seems quite difficult. Yet similar demands are made in other areas of competition law, such as
when market power screens are employed. It would seem that, except when an enforcer’s claim is
transparently weak (which may depend on poor lawyering as well as a lack of factual basis), it would
be almost impossible to dispose of a case without some (and possibly significant) assessment of
parties’ competing factual claims.
102 Sometimes courts also dismiss cases at the outset when factual disputes exist, essentially inferring
from the weakness of a plaintiff’s complaint that it seems unlikely that its case is substantial. To the
extent that this practice becomes more common after Twombly, perhaps plaintiffs will begin to offer
expert reports and other evidence at this early stage, even though such proffers are supposed to be
unnecessary. Preliminary studies of the effects of Twombly are described in Kaplow (2011c, 738
n.139).
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prohibition is a reasonably close approximation to what is meant.103 Second
and related, those stating the law in this manner offer neither a reasonably clear
operational statement of the rule nor a series of crisp examples from which the
contours may readily be inferred. They differ on whether tacit agreements are
included, but do not in any case define the concept, and in other respects they
employ key terms that are ambiguous or even susceptible to opposite
interpretations.
On the other hand, if one considers the actual language of typical prohib-
itions, which often include terms like conspiracy or concerted action, one is led
to a broad prohibition of interdependent oligopolistic behavior. Essentially,
these terms focus our attention on the existence of a meeting of the minds,
not (contrary to a communications-based prohibition) on the use of particular
acts that might be employed to achieve such a mutual understanding.
Interestingly, Donald Turner’s (1962, 665, 671) seminal article that advances
the view that the law’s prohibition should be circumscribed as a matter of policy
nevertheless endorses this broader interpretation of Sherman Act Section 1’s
language: “It is not novel conspiracy doctrine to say that agreement can be
signified by action as well as by words . . . . [T]here are far better grounds for
saying that though there may be ‘agreement’ it is not unlawful agreement.”104
Indeed, the statutes, the general law of conspiracy, and numerous authoritative,
earlier Supreme Court decisions support this view. Moreover, the broader in-
terpretation that encompasses interdependent oligopoly behavior is more con-
sistent with the actual practices of lower courts regarding their use of so-called
plus factors to find a conspiracy, their instructions to juries on liability, and
their method of determining damages. In addition, litigants’ behavior with
regard to the paradox of proof (as suggested in subsection 3.4.3), as well as
103 See also Kaplow (2011c, sec. III.B.2) and supra note 55 (discussing how a communications-based
prohibition is akin to treating the proscribed acts as facilitating practices, perhaps eschewing any
agreement requirement with respect to their use, while implicitly deeming price fixing itself to be
legal).
104 Turner (1962, 683) concludes on the matter as follows:
I also find considerable appeal, as a general matter, in defining “agreement” for purposes
of Sherman Act law in terms of interdependence of decisions, if for no other reason than
that it seems to me to be a clearer and more workable standard than any other standard,
of acceptable scope, which requires something more. Once one goes beyond the
boundaries of explicit, verbally communicated assent to a common course of action—a
step long since taken and from which it would not seem reasonable to retreat—it is
extraordinarily difficult if not impossible to define clearly a plausible limit short of
interdependence.
It is ironic, therefore, that the Twombly Court, 550 U.S. at 554, cites Turner (1962, 672), for the proposition:
“[M]ere interdependence of basic price decisions is not conspiracy.”
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practitioners’ advice and firms’ actions, suggests that many hold a broad de
facto view of the scope of liability.105
Finally, the matter needs to be considered in the context of courts’ and
agencies’ overall approach toward competition policy in the recent era, which
takes statutory provisions more as invitations to formulate sound rules106 and,
in developing these rules and offering interpretations, reflects an endorsement
(stronger in the United States, but growing in the European Union and else-
where) of economically grounded analysis in lieu of formalistic thinking. As
mentioned in the Introduction, the U.S. Supreme Court has strongly and re-
peatedly advanced this approach, most notably in decisions that overrule pre-
cedents.107 Hence, even if a literal interpretation and prior decisions did suggest
otherwise—which is hardly apparent—it is not clear that they would pose a
significant obstacle to reform if it came to be understood that views favoring a
narrow communications-based prohibition were mistaken. There tends to be a
significant lag between theoretical and empirical developments in economic
understanding and their dissemination into policy circles and legal advocacy,
which eventually translates them into revised interpretations of competition
law. With regard to oligopoly pricing, the interval seems longer than usual
(despite Posner’s early paper and book chapter), a shortcoming that is most
appropriately attributable to the behavior of academics, government agencies,
and lawyers rather than to the courts.108
4.6. Comments on Prior Literature
It is surprising that most prior commentary seems to have reached a consensus
in favor of a communications-based prohibition without defining it or system-
atically comparing it to the more direct approach considered here. Indeed, there
is very little overlap in content between most prior analysis of how competition
policy should address coordinated oligopoly pricing and the present treatment.
The most notable exception, as mentioned, is Posner’s writing from decades
ago, whose existence is frequently acknowledged but whose substance is usually
ignored. For the most part, commentators rely on three arguments: it is infeas-
ible to command irrational behavior (abstinence from coordinated price
105 See Kaplow (2011c, part III (also addressing EU Article 101, formerly 81)).
106 For the United States, see, for example, Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899, Areeda and Hovenkamp (2003, 226),
Baxter (1982), and Kintner (1980, 166, 217, 239).
107 Two of the three cases mentioned there, Sylvania and Leegin, expressly overruled precedents.
108 For example, with regard to the Supreme Court’s Brooke Group decision, Baker (1994, 602 and n.84)
points out that the plaintiff’s submissions and the Court neglected modern economic literature on
oligopoly theory that was pertinent to the question at hand.
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elevation); a direct prohibition would be inconsistent with the legality of
price elevation by monopolists; and injunctive relief would be tantamount
to price regulation. Even in extensive treatments of competition law toward
price fixing, these points are usually asserted in a few sentences or at most a
few paragraphs.109 Although it has been explained why the first two argu-
ments are confused and the third has been implicitly addressed at length, it is
worth confronting each directly here.
The argument that a prohibition on successful oligopolistic coordination—
without a further requirement that particular acts were employed—would
entail commanding firms to behave irrationally is addressed in section 2.3.
The simple response is deterrence: the threat of sanctions changes what firms
find to be in their interest to do (as long as the expected punishment exceeds the
profits from oligopolistic price elevation). In this respect, coordinated pricing is
little different from unsafe disposal of toxic waste or cheating on taxes, activities
that profit-maximizing firms find it in their rational interest to undertake, that
is, unless there are substantial penalties.
The second argument is that prohibiting oligopolistic coordination and thus
the resulting price elevation is inconsistent with permitting monopolists to
charge supracompetitive prices. Subsection 2.1.2 explains the rationale for dif-
ferential treatment. Indeed, the justification for permitting firms to reap the
rewards of dynamically efficient behavior while denying them profits from
higher prices attributable merely to their refraining from competition is entirely
familiar. Moreover, the logic of this objection, as noted before, applies equally
to classic cartels. That is, if oligopolists should be free to raise prices because
monopolists are permitted to do so, the logic applies not only to purely inter-
dependent coordination but also to that facilitated by additional means of
communication such as meetings in hotel rooms. Of course, none who offer
this argument favor making cartels legal.
The third objection is that remedies, with a focus on injunctive relief, would
entail all the difficulties associated with price regulation.110 As just mentioned,
this claim is confused because it overlooks deterrence through the prospect of
109 See sources cited supra notes 23 and 46 and infra note 110.
110 See, e.g., Turner (1962, 669) (referring to a “purely public-utility interpretation of the Sherman
Act”); Areeda & Hovenkamp (2003, 206) (noting “the absence of a practical remedy other than
judicial price control”); id. at 232–233 (suggesting that the required injunction would be “equivalent
to . . . compelling marginal-cost pricing” which “puts the antitrust tribunal directly in the
price-control business”); id. at 273 (describing the FTC’s view in du Pont); Baker (1996, 47)
(“the only remedy is judicial price regulation—a complete non-starter”); Elhauge & Geradin
(2007, 835) (“Could courts figure out whether they had done so other than by asking whether
the prices were reasonable?”); and Scherer (1977, 984).
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penalties.111 Also, as explained in section 2.3, it is unclear that injunctions have
an important role to play in attacking successful oligopolistic coordination.
Instead, the real question involves the feasibility of detection: if detection is
highly imperfect and involves a substantial risk of false positives, socially costly
chilling effects will ensue.
Of course, the concern about detection and chilling effects—and related
matters of the appropriate burden of proof and the use of varying types of
evidence of differing reliability—has consumed much of the attention in this
article, beginning with subsection 2.1.3, developed in section 2.2, and applied to
a communications-based prohibition in sections 3.3 through 3.5. Among the
highlights are: chilling effects indeed constitute one of the two central concerns
(along with deterrence) in designing a legal regime addressed to coordinated
oligopoly pricing; as a consequence, it is important to consider the full range of
types of evidence, employing appropriate mixes in particular cases rather than
arbitrarily confining attention to a subset that may or may not be reliable in a
given application; and evidentiary standards should depend on the nature of
proof. Moreover, systematic comparison in section 3.5 with commentators’
preferred communications-based prohibition is not favorable to it in this regard,
which nearly everyone seems to take for granted: defendants are exonerated in
situations in which the social danger is greatest and chilling costs are likely to be
low, whereas they may be found liable when the danger is modest and the risk of
chilling desirable behavior is high—the reverse of what would be optimal.
Additionally, a communications-based prohibition may well be more difficult
to implement, perhaps substantially so. These matters are not examined in prior
treatments of the subject that advance the objection under consideration.
5. CONCLUSION
Determination of an optimal regime to combat coordinated oligopolistic price
elevation requires attention to the social objective, the problem of detection,
and the design of sanctions. The social purpose of the regime is to deter such
price elevation. Successful oligopolistic coordination may be detected through a
number of means, ideally considered in combination. Its presence or absence
may be demonstrated by market-based evidence, notably pricing patterns and
indications of price elevation, and also by the use of facilitating practices. The
degree to which industry conditions are conducive to collusion is also highly
111 Furthermore, as discussed in section 3.6, penalties are also required under a communications-based
prohibition, and fines (and/or private damage awards) really should be geared to the magnitude of
oligopolists’ price elevation, so the need for such measurement is not avoided, only deferred (and
limited to cases that happen to involve demonstrable prohibited acts).
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relevant. In a sense, conduciveness is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient
one—because of the possibility that deterrence is effective, among other rea-
sons. Interfirm communications, the emphasis of much prior analysis of the
subject, can be probative but are not necessary, both as a logical matter and
because proof may be lacking even when they are present. All bases for assess-
ment may be established, reinforced, or negated by evidence internal to firms,
including many sorts that do not speak directly to coordination. For example, if
the main alternative explanation for a sudden price increase is a cost shock,
firms’ internal records may well indicate whether such an event occurred.
The analysis of sanctions focuses on fines and private damage awards because
monetary sanctions are heavily used and tend to be the most efficient tool.
Imprisonment can provide a helpful supplement in achieving deterrence.
Injunctions do not seem to be widely used and do not appear to be important
in principle because they fail to generate deterrence and must be enforced
through other sanctions in any event. Nevertheless, many writers seem to be
preoccupied with injunctions and believe that rules of liability need to be
crafted, and possibly significantly constrained, by the feasibility of injunctions
of a particular type, tantamount to command-and-control regulation.
Most commentators—legal analysts and economists, in the European Union
and the United States—believe that current law is best described as and should
be a communications-based prohibition, interpreting notions of agreement,
conspiracy, and concerted action so as to limit liability to cases in which the
use of particular, explicit forms of communication have been employed.
Operational statements of the content of the imagined rule are difficult to
extract, and there are serious questions regarding the aptness of their charac-
terization of existing law, both subjects of a predecessor to this article (Kaplow
2011c). Perhaps most notable, conventional policy discussion of this subject has
little overlap with the analysis offered here, which should raise serious doubt
about whether the dominant view is well grounded. Systematic examination of
the social objective, the problem of detection, and the matter of appropriate
sanctions does not generate the commonly favored rule, indicating that it
indeed is not optimal. Nevertheless, this article is devoted to explicit compari-
son of the direct approach with the widely endorsed alternative.
The communications-based prohibition considers only a subset of means to
a socially undesirable end rather than focusing on the end itself, deterrence, and
on other matters of direct concern, notably, chilling effects (although the latter
obviously motivate those advancing the approach). Its main deficiencies can be
traced to this core trait. To begin, the communications-based prohibition is
defined in a formalistic way that is significantly removed from the social ob-
jective. Indeed, this is an inherent feature, for under a functional approach it
dissolves into the direct method, which its proponents reject.
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Regarding the central challenge of detection, the communications-based pro-
hibition utilizes a large body of relevant types of evidence only indirectly, even
when it is highly probative of the ultimate social question, and considers an-
other portion of evidence (on conduciveness of conditions) to bear on liability
in a manner opposite to its implications for social welfare. Hence, even before
undertaking a detailed inquiry, the dominant view appears dubious. When one
focuses on the wrong question, one is unlikely to obtain a good answer, much
less the best one—and this logic holds even when the correct answer is difficult
to ascertain due to limited empirical knowledge and the complexity of the task.
To be sure, detection is not particularly problematic in those cases that generate
smoking-gun evidence, such as tapes of secret price-fixing meetings, but such
evidence would likewise be credited under the more direct approach to liability.
Serious defects, however, become apparent when considering proof by circum-
stantial evidence, which is widely allowed and thought to be essential in light of
firms’ efforts to hide their actions.
As explained at length, the logical inference process entailed by a commu-
nications-based prohibition gives rise to a paradox of proof that has startling
implications that do not seem well appreciated. The proof process is highly
complex and depends on knowledge that does not exist and is unlikely to
become available. It implies that enforcers and defendants would routinely
adopt strategies in adjudication that are not widely employed. Most important,
in comparing the two approaches, the communications-based prohibition is
relatively more likely to find liability when deterrence benefits are low and
chilling costs are high, while it exonerates defendants when deterrence benefits
are greatest and chilling costs are low. Accordingly, it seems quite unlikely to be
an optimal compromise or a sensible proxy criterion for determining when
sanctions should be applied. It is explained how the direct method—with a
burden of proof calibrated to provide a similar rate of applicability to potential
cases—dominates the communications-based prohibition in the sense that the
former finds liability in cases characterized both by relatively larger deterrence
benefits and relatively smaller chilling costs than under the latter.
There exist some further conundrums. If certain common empirical conjec-
tures are granted, the actual outcomes under a communications-based prohib-
ition would hardly differ from those under the more direct approach, which
makes all the more curious the intensity with which proponents insist that it be
rejected. Relatedly, if cases with successful oligopolistic coordination and no
explicit communications are rare, as many assert,112 then even under a narrow,
communications-based prohibition, a private or government enforcer should
112 See supra subsection 3.4.4.
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prevail (not just at preliminary stages, but even at trial) upon demonstration of
successful coordinated price elevation, absent strong proof from defendants
that their case is truly exceptional—a point that commentators and courts
have overlooked. Additionally, there are serious reasons to question the
standard view about the implications of highly conducive conditions, and it
is possible that the central difference in the two approaches vanishes. The
communications-based prohibition also raises complications in assessing the
appropriate magnitude of sanctions. Finally, such a prohibition may be more
(perhaps much more) complex and costly to implement than a direct one.
This article also analyzes a doctrinally radical alternative of disallowing all
circumstantial evidence. It has a prima facie plausibility that the commonly
advanced version lacks, although it is difficult to define and is subject to various
shortcomings. If it happened to be true that smoking-gun evidence would
quickly turn up whenever successful oligopolistic coordination took place,
then a highly circumscribed approach may be adequate, but the direct approach
would produce this result under such an assumption. However, it is widely
believed that this detection strategy by itself is insufficient—and, indeed, it
might miss those cases involving the greatest expected social harm. If so, a
wider range of detection methods needs to be permitted, and in any event
the choice of methods and setting of proof burdens should grow out of a
decision-making framework aimed at maximizing social welfare, not at meeting
a formalistic requirement.
Brief consideration is also given to the fit of various approaches with pre-
vailing doctrine. Competition authorities and adjudicators, especially the U.S.
Supreme Court, have increasingly embraced rules grounded in economic
understandings while rejecting formalistic alternatives. Accordingly, if the sys-
tematic application of economic analysis to the most important competition
rule suggests a need for modification, one should expect the relevant legal
authorities to be receptive—and the language and somewhat amorphous inter-
pretation of existing rules may pose little obstacle in any event (Kaplow 2011c).
The article also examines the implications of the communications-based pro-
hibition for other competition rules and the impact of ongoing evolution in
electronic communications. Finally, the leading arguments in prior literature in
favor of a narrow prohibition—each more a brief observation than a developed
construct—are related to the present analysis.
This investigation is preliminary in a number of respects. First, there has been
little prior analysis of most of the relevant territory: concerning elaboration of
the social objective, including the development of chilling costs and the frame-
work for trading off errors; assessment of the many avenues of detection, with
further attention to chilling costs and an emphasis on internal as well as other
forms of evidence; and the choice among sanctions and setting of their
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magnitude. (For further exploration, see Kaplow (2011a).) Second, a number of
key decisions, at least as a matter of degree, raise empirical questions about
which evidence is limited. Third, the interplay with enforcement institutions
needs further attention. It may be, for example, that the optimal legal rule for a
system with exclusive government enforcement using an expert agency differs
from that for a regime allowing private suits adjudicated by generalist judges
and lay juries.
Despite these significant reservations, it does appear that wholesale rethink-
ing is in order. The predecessor to this article (Kaplow 2011c) explains how
existing formulations of the legal prohibition are incoherent to a substantial
degree and differ greatly from what many advancing them seem to contemplate.
Furthermore, consensus characterizations of existing practice are difficult to
state operationally and conflict with much of what actually seems to take place.
More relevant for policy purposes, this article offers a systematic comparison
of commentators’ favored method and a more direct approach. It turns out that
the investigation differs even in basic subject matter coverage (not just in pos-
sible bottom lines) from most prior work on the topic. When the commonly
supported communications-based prohibition is compared to the more direct
approach outlined here, sharp differences appear, and in important respects the
former seems to have much backwards.
These articles therefore constitute a strong critique of present thinking about
competition law directed toward coordinated price elevation. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that the criticism herein is not primarily aimed at courts
because academics and other analysts are primarily responsible for assessing
policy. This article seeks to rekindle and advance a long-dormant policy debate
on perhaps the most important subject of competition regulation. It also sug-
gests directions for empirical research that would valuably illuminate the sub-
ject and thus better guide future competition policy in this realm.113
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